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INTRODUCTION
While the Internet has revolutionized communication and commerce, it
has also created the conditions for a type of crime that can be committed
anonymously, from anywhere in the world, and with consequences that are
unprecedented in scope. With the failure of traditional law enforcement
methods to deal with these challenges, computer crime requires a new
approach to thinking about deterrence. Focusing on a particular type of
computer crime, unwarranted intrusions into private computer networks,
this Note argues that "tailoring the punishment to fit the crime" might mean
focusing on something besides punishment. It proposes a regulated system
of privately sponsored "hack-in" contests to supplement the criminal law,
which has proved inadequate at deterring computer crime.
Computer crime comes in many varieties, including online theft and
fraud, vandalism, and politically motivated activities.2 Other hackers simply
try to break code, seeking challenge, competition, and bragging rights.'
1. See infra Part I (describing the difficulty of enforcing laws that criminalize hacking); see
also infra text accompanying notes 120-124 (describing business losses due to computer crime).
2. The hack-in contest proposal is not designed to impact the behavior of these kinds of
hackers. A hack-in contest is unlikely to provide a viable substitute for an antiglobalization
activist who wants to vandalize a website or for a profit-motivated hacker who uses the computer
as a tool to engage in old-fashioned crime. The contest proposal is especially suited to shaping the
behavior of those hackers who enjoy challenge and seek bragging rights.
3. See, e.g., Eric J. Sinrod & William P. Reilly, Cyber-Crimes: A Practical Approach to the
Application of Federal Computer Crime Laws, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
177, 183-87 (2000) (recognizing three primary types of hacking: (1) politically motivated
"hacktivism," (2) crime carried out by disgruntled employees, and (3) recreational hacking-
including both malicious and nonmalicious activities-carried out for "the thrill of the challenge
or for bragging rights in the hacking community" (citation omitted)); Peter Grabosky, Computer
Crime: A Criminological Overview 3, at http://www.aic.gov.au/conferences/other/
graboskyjpeter/2000-04-vienna.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2002).
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Whatever the motivation, intrusions have serious costs. 4 At the very least, a
violated site must patch the security hole. Even a nonmalicious trespass
disrupts the victim's online services while the breach is fixed. Not knowing
whether or not a breach was malicious, companies generally expend
resources investigating the matter, often hiring private investigators so that
they do not suffer reputational loss. 5 If other hackers become aware of the
site's vulnerability, a nonmalicious hack may be the precursor to more
malicious attacks.6 Finally, considering the gravity of the risk, attack
victims may change their behavior, becoming reluctant to put valuable
information online.7
How can private actors, alongside government, deter such activity?
Two basic approaches have been suggested. First, some scholars have
imagined creative ways of reinforcing the criminal law with other kinds of
constraints on behavior.8 Second, others have suggested that the least
dangerous kinds of hacking should be decriminalized in ways that
demarginalize the hacking community and actually increase Internet
security.
9
4. See generally Andrew Conry-Murray, Strategies and Issues: Deciphering the Cost of a
Computer Crime, NETWORK MAG., Apr. 5, 2002, at http://www.networkmagazine.com/article/
NMG20020401 S0003 (discussing the kinds of costs that victims of computer crime bear and how
to prove the amount of those costs in court). A 1995 survey by Ernst & Young found that of 1290
businesses, nearly half had suffered security breaches in the past two years, and at least twenty
had incurred related losses exceeding one million dollars. See Joseph C. Panettieri, Ernst & Young
Security Survey: SECURITY, INFORMATIONWEEK, Nov. 27, 1995, at
http://www.informationweek.com/555/55mtsec.htm.
5. According to William J. Cook, author of the Justice Department's manual on computer
prosecution, "organizations often swallow losses quietly rather than notifying the authorities and
advertising their vulnerability to shareholders and clients." Marc S. Friedman & Kristin Bissinger,
Infojacking: Crimes on the Information Superhighway, 9 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 2, 2 (1997)
(citation omitted). Companies are increasingly pursuing private enforcement measures to monitor
security breaches. In 2000, companies spent an estimated $300 billion on private enforcement.
Michael L. Rustad, Private Enforcement of Cybercrime on the Electronic Frontier, 11 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 63, 100 (2001).
6. While companies are reticent to report security breaches and lose customers, they also fear
that a reported hack both invites retributive attacks and highlights vulnerabilities to other hackers.
See Pam Mendels, Companies Found Sometimes Reluctant To Press Cybererime Cases, WASH.
INTERNET DAILY, Apr. 24, 2002, at 4. The first hacker to gain access to a site may even engage in
"war chalking," leaving marks identifying unprotected systems. Colin Barker, We Have Nothing
To Fear but Fear Itself COMPUTING, Sept. 27, 2002, at 39, at http://www.computing.co.uk/
Features/I 135465.
7. See D. Jean Veta et al., Is Your Company Protected? Developing a Comprehensive Cyber-
Security Plan To Mitigate Legal Exposure from Cyber-Crime, CYBERSPACE LAW., July-Aug.
2002, at 5 (noting the potentially huge legal liability companies may face if their customers'
proprietary information is stolen online).
8. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); Neal
Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1003 (2001).
9. See, e.g., SUELETTE DREYFUS, UNDERGROUND: TALES OF HACKING, MADNESS AND
OBSESSION ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 450-51 (1997), available at
http://rubberhouse.sourceforge.net/underground!Underground.pdf; PAUL A. TAYLOR, HACKERS:
CRIME IN THE DIGITAL SUBLIME (1999); Michael Lee et al., Comment, Electronic Commerce,
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Those in the first group have expanded on the Beckerian framework,
long dominant in thinking about deterrence, which limits policymakers to
manipulation of two factors in deterring crime-probability of detection
and severity of sentence.'0 Scholars looking beyond this framework have
incorporated social norms,1l architecture,' 2 and monetary costs 13 as
additional constraints on crime. Neal Katyal, for example, argues that
monetary costs should supplement criminal sanctions because they
constrain all actors, whereas legal sanction is only probabilistic.' 4 The
insight is well taken. Criminal constraints alone will not effectively deter
computer crime. Law must help second and third parties-victims of
computer crime and Internet users-deter crime themselves."
Even this most recent scholarship at the vanguard of deterrence theory,
however, approaches deterrence from a cost perspective. Departing from
this tradition, this Note argues that, just as the "law should strive to channel
crime into outlets that are more costly,"' 6 it should also encourage
mechanisms that channel criminal behavior into legal outlets.
The second group of scholars argues that "look-and-see" hacking,
where hackers only explore systems without damaging them, and perhaps
report that they have breached security, is victimless and should be
decriminalized. They argue that decriminalization would result in a number
of social benefits, including an increase in Internet security as hackers
identify latent vulnerabilities, a better allocation of law enforcement
resources, and the development of creative people with technological
skills.' 7 The arguments do not satisfy opponents of decriminalization,
Hackers, and the Search for Legitimacy: A Regulatory Proposal, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 839
(1999).
10. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968).
11. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349
(1997).
12. See generally LESSIG, supra note 8 (arguing that code, the architecture of the Internet,
provides many constraints on web behavior); Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control,
111 YALE L.J. 1039 (2002) (showing how architecture-the construction of space--constrains
behavior and can deter crime).
13. Katyal, supra note 8.
14. id. at 1010.
15. Id. at 1013.
16. Id. at 1006.
17. See, e.g., DREYFUS, supra note 9, at 452, 454 (arguing that punishing "look-and-see"
hackers results in a misallocation of law enforcement resources); TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 43
(arguing that hacking "has been responsible for many of the most progressive developments in
software development" (quoting ANDREW Ross, STRANGE WEATHER: CULTURE, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY IN THE AGE OF LIMITS 81 (1991)); Lee et al., supra note 9, at 882-86 (arguing that
limited decriminalization may increase online security; reconstruct trust among hackers, law
enforcement, and the computer security industry; and make the construction of cyberspace
architecture less opaque); Douglas Hayward, Hackers: Friends or Foes?, TECHWEB, Sept. 15,
1997, at http:f/content.techweb.com/wire/news/1997/09/0915hackersl.html (quoting Paul Taylor
as suggesting that by criminalizing all forms of hacking, society will lose many of the benefits
derived from technological curiosity and creativity).
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however, who emphasize that decriminalization fails to signal clearly that
hacking is a proscribed activity.
8
This Note seeks to develop a proposal-the "hack-in contest"-that
appeals to both proponents and opponents of decriminalization. First,
contests can capture the benefits of decriminalization without sacrificing
the expressive and preference-shaping functions of the criminal law.
Second, contests provide positive incentives for law-abiding hacking, an
important approach given a hacking subculture that may be unreceptive to
sanctions. 9 Seeking to introduce positive reinforcement and "channeling
structures" into the toolbox of criminal deterrence, this Note argues that a
system of structured hack-in days will channel behavior away from illegal
hacking toward approved activities. An effective system of contests may
even strengthen positive norms among hackers, shaping preferences for
law-abiding behavior.21 While privately sponsored hack-in contests are
already prevalent,2 2 these contests lack regularity and fail to distinguish
between approved and illegal hacking. Unlike these private contests, a
regulated system of competitions should be designed to deter computer
crime.
Part I of this Note outlines the current responses and proposals
concerning computer crime and their general failure to prevent unwarranted
intrusions. It contends that raising costs may not effectively deter hacking
and that decriminalization undermines the expressive function of the
criminal law. Part II begins by examining the preference-shaping function
of the criminal law, arguing that "positive reinforcement" may be as
effective at preference shaping as criminal sanctions. It then argues that the
social norms latent in hacker culture may be more effectively harnessed by
positive incentives than by sanctions. Part III proposes a hack-in contest
framework that encourages law-abiding norms and shapes preferences for
legal hacking. Part IV compares the contest proposal to broader
decriminalization models and anticipates several objections to the proposal.
18. See, e.g., Mary M. Calkins, Note, They Shoot Trojan Horses, Don't They? An Economic
Analysis ofAnti-Hacking Regulatory Models, 89 GEO. L.J. 171,206 (2000).
19. See, e.g., Naftali Bendavid, FBI Hacks into Web of Intruders: Computer Rebels Hit Back
with Daring Cyber-Pranks, CHI. TRIB., May 29, 1999, § 1, at 1 (describing hacker taunts of the
FBI and disrespect of law enforcement officials).
20. Positive reinforcement has been largely ignored both as a deterrent to crime and as a tool
of rehabilitation, despite evidence indicating that the promise of reward may motivate actors even
more than the threat of punishment. See, e.g., Irving Piliavin et al., Crime, Deterrence, and
Rational Choice, 51 AM. Soc. REV. 10t, 117 (1986).
21. For an extended discussion of preference shaping, see Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An
Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. I, 2
(arguing that, "in addition to creating disincentives for criminal activity, criminal punishment is
intended to promote various social norms of individual behavior by shaping the preferences of
criminals and the population at large").
22. See infra Section III.A (describing the prevalence, structure, and goals of private hack-in
contests).
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I. PREVIOUS RESPONSES AND PROPOSALS
CONCERNING COMPUTER CRIME
A. Law, Code, and the Market
The first cases of computer crime were heralded as an unprecedented
phenomenon that law was not equipped to handle.23 Scholars and
policymakers have since proposed a number of deterrence strategies, from
criminal sanctions to tort law and the architecture of the web itself, but none
of these methods has proved successful at deterring criminal hacking.
Congress prohibited unwarranted intrusions in the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 1984 (CFAA).24 Among other problems, prosecutorial
difficulties have minimized the CFAA's deterrent effect. Shortly after
criminalization, the low number of prosecutions prompted some to suggest
that antihacking laws were largely symbolic.25 Enforcement remains
difficult, especially given the near impossibility of prosecuting attempts
under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(b),26 and the need for a great investment of time,
resources, and skill---even assuming that local law enforcement agents have
the requisite training. 2 7 Digital anonymity, encryption technologies, and the
circuitous process of electronic tracing give cybercriminals an advantage
over law enforcement.28 With jurisdictional uncertainties looming in cases
that are expensive to investigate and that require sophisticated tracking
capabilities, state prosecution is almost impossible. 29
23. See, e.g., Christopher D. Chen, Note, Computer Crime and the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 1986, 10 COMPUTER/L.J. 71, 84 (1990) (arguing that education about computer
abuse is necessary given that law is insufficient to solve computer crime); Brenda Nelson, Note,
Straining the Capacity of the Law: The Idea of Computer Crime in the Age of the Computer
Worm, 11 CoMpuTER/L.J. 299, 299 (1991) (describing, in the precriminalization days, the
struggle to apply traditional criminal law doctrines to computer abuse).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000).
25. See Michael P. Dierks, Computer Network Abuse, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 328 (1993)
(noting that during the first six years of the CFAA, the only successful prosecution was that of
Robert Morris); see also Kenneth Rosenblatt, Deterring Computer Crime, TECH. REV., Feb.-Mar.
1990, at 35.
26. First, the CFAA requires that hackers cause reckless or negligent damage before they may
be prosecuted. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(ii)-(iii). This is much less likely to occur during an
attempt than during an actual intrusion. See Calkins, supra note 18, at 196-97. Second, the
significant difficulties targets face in detecting successful intrusions are exaggerated with mere
attempts.
27. Cybercrime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the Senate Appropriations Comm., 106th Cong. 27-30 (2000)
[hereinafter Cybercrime Hearing] (statement of Louis J. Frech, Director, FBI) (noting the lack of
training at the state level).
28. See Katyal, supra note 8, at 1047-48.
29. Friedman & Bissinger, supra note 5, at 10 ("Most states do not have divisions of their
police force or district attorney staff dedicated to cases of computer theft, damage or injury and
what is often perceived as victimless crime gets shuffled to the side."); Rustad, supra note 5, at
98-99; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER: THE CHALLENGE OF UNLAWFUL
CONDUCT INVOLVrNG THE USE OF THE INTERNET 34 (2000), at http://www.usdoj.gov/
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Proponents of tort liability for computer crime argue that, as compared
to the criminal law, civil actions give targets control over the litigation.3
The possibility of obtaining damages gives targets, otherwise unwilling to
admit electronic vulnerabilities to consumers, an incentive to report.'
While Internet Service Provider (ISP) liability has received the most
attention as a serious proposal,32 four varieties of tort liability are possible
in the computer-crime context-(1) hacker liability, (2) ISP liability, (3)
security company liability, and (4) liability for victims who fail to take
private precautions. A general but significant critique of these proposals is
that tort liability does not carry a strong symbolic message condemning
illegal hacking. The various tort proposals are unlikely to succeed for
specific reasons, too: hackers tend to be judgment proof,33 holding ISPs
liable may actually increase hacking,34 holding security companies to a high
standard of liability may make their products prohibitively expensive and
may be less effective than providing incentives to good practice, 35 and
criminal/eybercrime/unlawful.htm (citing the barriers to state enforcement, such as lack of
resources, jurisdiction, subpoena power, etc.).
30. See Ian C. Ballon, Alternative Corporate Responses to Internet Data Theft, in 17TH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW 737, 744 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks &
Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 471, 1997) (describing the benefits of civil, as
opposed to criminal, computer-crime actions).
31. See David L. Gripman, The Doors Are Locked but the Thieves and Vandals Are Still
Getting in: A Proposal in Tort To Alleviate Corporate America's Cyber-Crime Problem, 16 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 167, 174-76 (1997); Daniel Sieberg, FBI: Cybercrime
Rising, yet Fewer Companies Reporting Incidents, CNN.COM, Apr. 8, 2002, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/TECH/intemet/04/07/cybercrime.survey/index.htm ("Many firms cite
the fear of bad publicity for their reluctance to alert authorities, while others prefer not to divulge
any proprietary information to investigators.").
32. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 8, at 1095-101 (discussing difficulties with ISP liability). See
generally TIMOTHY D. CASEY, ISP LIABILITY SURVIVAL GLIDE: STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING
COPYRIGHT, SPAM, CACHE, AND PRIVACY REGULATIONS (2000) (showing ISPs how to protect
themselves and limit their liability as governments around the world establish laws and
regulations relating to the Internet).
33. See Ian C. Ballon, The Law of the Internet: Developing a Framework for Making New
Law, in FIRST ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE 9, 15 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks &
Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No, 482, 1997) ("Internet tortfeasors and infringers are
likely to include a high percentage of students and others who may not have the resources to
satisfy large judgments.").
34. Hackers, aware that targets are likely to focus their legal efforts on the party with deep
pockets, have an incentive to launch their attacks from such deep-pocket ISPs. Moreover, because
ISPs gain little from risky subscribers, saddling ISPs with liability for the acts of their subscribers
may lead to the expulsion of a number of users, threatening the Internet's potential benefits.
Calkins, supra note 18, at 215-16, 219.
35. Some efforts to encourage good security practice are already underway. See Charles
Babington, Clinton Plan Targets "Cyber-Terrorism," WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2000, at El
(describing college scholarships for students planning to enter the computer security field in
exchange for their public service after graduation); Vernon Loeb, Launching a Counteroffensive
in Cyberspace: Program Training Corp of Experts in Computer Security, WASH. POST, Feb. 5,
2000, at A3 (describing government efforts to train experts); Dan Verton, Schmidt Lays Out
Cyberprotection Board Agenda, CNN.COM, Mar. 15, 2002, at http://www.cnn com/2002/TECH/
industry/03/15/cyberprotection.agenda.idg/index.html (describing the federal government's efforts
to coordinate a national approach to protect essential networks).
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making victims bear the cost evinces an overly optimistic faith in the ability
of potential targets to safeguard their materials through technological
solutions.36
Just as tort law fails to provide a practical response to computer crime,
reliance on market solutions would lead many firms to take extreme
measures to protect themselves from vulnerability, potentially resulting in
undesirable architectural rules.37 Alternatively, one may discern a "broken
windows" effect if companies rely too heavily on self-help.38 While visible
self-help measures like protective software are essential and instill
confidence in the technological infrastructure, paradoxically, they may lead
to more crime. 39 Hackers may interpret the flowering of private security
measures as an indication of profligate hacking or lackluster monitoring and
as an invitation to hack.40
Security software is not the only technology that could be used to deter
hacking. Lawrence Lessig has been the most original and vocal proponent
of the idea that while behavioral constraints are modified by changing law
in real space, in cyberspace, constraints are more effectively altered by
changing code.41 While his approach is meta-architectural and does not
focus on individual security measures like security software, code is
inadequate to constrain hackers. Dorothy and Peter Denning have argued
that "the solutions... cannot be achieved solely by technological means.
36. Faith in technological solutions is especially inappropriate given the prevalence of "social
engineering"-inducing authorized persons to reveal passwords. See Jonathan J. Rusch, Don't
Look Now, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 289,298 (2000).
37. See LESSIG, supra note 8, at 59-60, 83, 98-99 (arguing that code embodies values
congruent with the interests of Internet commerce and that relatively invisible regulations, such as
regulation through code, lack transparency and are difficult to resist, resulting in undesirable
rules).
38. See generally James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29 (arguing that the appearance that crime is rampant encourages more
crime and that by reducing the visibility of social disorder, serious crime can be deterred).
39. See Network Security: Easy To Use but Hard To Get Right, COMPUTING, Mar. 28, 2002,
at 39 (suggesting that off-the-shelf security software can be more dangerous than having no
protection at all by creating a false sense of security and leading to unsafe practices that are visible
to hackers); Tony Dreier, To Protect and To Surf PC MAG., Feb. 26, 2002, at
http://www.pcmag.com/printarticle/0,3048,a=21990,00.asp (noting that many firewalls
promising zero maintenance lull users into a false sense of security, fail to alert them to new
hacking techniques, and indicate optimal targets to hackers).
40. Like in real space, security measures result from a fear of crime. Private measures
indicate a failure of criminal law to deter cybercrimie, and these measures have not proven
effective at deterring crime themselves. See Hackers Never, Ever Stop Hacking, INFOTECH
WKLY., Sept. 3, 2001, at 20 (noting that security measures are reactive and that the security
industry is driven forward by a need to patch security vulnerabilities); cf Kahan, supra note 11, at
389 ("[W]hen they feel reassured that law enforcement is adequate, law-abiders are more likely to
view private precautions as worthwhile, and less likely to see such precautions as signs that those
around them lack confidence in the efficacy of law."); Katyal, supra note 8, at 1109-11 (drawing
on the "broken windows" theory and arguing that visible signs of disorder in cyberspace breed
further disorder).
41. Lawrence Lessig, The Constitution of Code: Limitations on Choice-Based Critiques of
Cyberspace Regulation, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 181, 184 (1997).
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The answers will involve a complex interplay among law, policy, and
technology. ' '42 Moreover, many hackers turn to "social engineering," not
technology, when looking for weaknesses in computer networks.43 Hackers
often manipulate authorized users to gain access to networks, a practice that
is impossible to stop with technological solutions." Because sophisticated
hackers are not susceptible to regulation through code, code must be
supplemented to deter computer crime. Even in Lessig's own terms, code
must be complementary to the other "modalit[ies] of regulation"--law,
social norms, and the market.45 Yet it is precisely these mechanisms that
have proved unable to constrain illegal hacking effectively.
Unsatisfied with these approaches to computer crime, Katyal has
argued that raising perpetration costs, incurred by all who commit crime,
may be more effective.46 While the insight is provocative, some of his
proposals remain impractical. Charging fees to enter sites, while making
hacking more costly, may pose barriers to Internet commerce that overly
restrict productive uses. Likewise, it is not immediately evident how a
market for hacker tools could be constructed, since they are easy to post on
the web. Given foreign markets and jurisdictions, it may be impossible to
impose prices on these tools.
4 7
B. Decriminalization Proposals and Their Difficulties
Decriminalization is often suggested for "victimless crimes"--legally
prohibited activities that involve no unwilling or complaining party.4 8 Drug
use and prostitution are prominent examples. Among computer crimes,
nonmalicious intrusions, often characterized as "look-and-see" hacking, are
the strongest candidate. 49 Not surprisingly, some argue that this kind of
hacking should be decriminalized or regulated by a "duty to report.,
50
Proponents of decriminalization make five essential claims about its
benefits. First, decriminalization would lead to increased Internet security
42. Dorothy E. Denning & Peter J. Denning, Preface to INTERNET BESIEGED: COUNTERING
CYBERSPACE SCOFFLAWS, at vii, x (Dorothy E. Denning & Peter J. Denning eds., 1997).
43. David B. Fein & Mark W. Heaphy, Options when a System Has Been Hacked: Fear of
Bad Publicity Elicits Corporate Fight or Flight, CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 17, 2001, at 2.
44. Id.
45. LESSIG, supra note 8, at 87-90.
46. Katyal, supra note 8, at 1010.
47. See Ellen S. Podgor, International Computer Fraud- A Paradigm for Limiting National
Jurisdiction, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 267, 281-84 (2002) (discussing the complexities involved in
determining jurisdiction over computer crime internationally).
48. See, e.g., Kent Roach, Four Models of the Criminal Process, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 671,680 (1999).
49. As suggested in the Introduction and infra text accompanying notes 172-174,
nonmalicious hacking is hardly victimless.
50. Lee et al., supra note 9, at 882-83.
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as hackers identify latent security flaws.5 Second, as hackers made security
tighter, a reconstruction of trust among hackers, law enforcement personnel,
and security professionals would follow.5 2 Third, by decriminalizing the
most minimally harmful hacking, law enforcement resources would be
conserved and concentrated on more destructive hacking. 3 Fourth, under a
blanket prohibition on hacking, we lose the social benefits of creating a
space where technological skills can be developed in creative ways.5 4 Fifth,
limited decriminalization may help bridge the cultural gap between hackers
and regular Internet users, opening up a discussion of the policy
implications of changes in code. Under the presence of hackers' watchful
eyes, the implementation of architectural changes in cyberspace is more
likely to reflect democratic principles.55
The most prominent and narrowly circumscribed decriminalization
proposal in the legal literature to date is the "duty to report." Proponents of
this reporting duty defend it by arguing that "[sJuccessful incidents of
unauthorized access should be presumed by law to be nonmalicious if the
actor makes a good-faith effort to report the incident to the proprietor of the
accessed system immediately upon obtaining access. 5 6 The implication is
that a reported hack could not have been malicious and that the "target" site
is not a victim. These authors claim that the rule would (1) lead to
cooperation and mutual trust between hackers and law enforcement; (2)
revive self-regulating, law-abiding norms among hackers; and (3) increase
Internet security.
57
Even modest decriminalization plans like the duty to report seek these
benefits at the cost of undermining the criminal law.5 8 The reporting rule,
which presumes that any episode of reported unauthorized access is
nonmalicious, does not absolutely prohibit any behavior and is unlikely to
deter computer crime. Since it does not attach a value judgment to
unauthorized access per se, the rule could not shape preferences.
51. Id. at 883.
52. Id. at 883-84.
53. DREYFUS, supra note 9, at 452-54 ("[A] great deal of time and money has been wasted in
the pursuit of look-see hackers.... Make look-see hacking a minor offence and the institutions
will stop going after the soft targets and hopefully spend more time on the real criminals.").
54. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 51 (finding that hacking is "curiosity-driven" and motivated by
"relentless pursuit of the answer to a technical problem").
55. Lee et al., supra note 9, at 885-86 (arguing that as decriminalization bridges the cultural
gap between hackers and ordinary Internet users, hackers could become "a loosely organized
coalition of consumer advocates who could provide a forum, however informal, for the discussion
and implementation of code at a collective level" and that hackers could provide ordinary users
important information about the consequences of architectural developments).
56. Id. at 882-83.
57. Id. at 883-85.
58. See Calkins, supra note 18, at 203-09 (arguing that the reporting rule will neither deter
computer crime nor shape hacker preferences); infra Section IV.A.
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11. PREFERENCE SHAPING, HACKER CULTURE, AND
SOCIAL MEANING
The criminal law does not simply inspire rational calculations about the
probability of detection and the severity of the punishment.59 Kenneth Dau-
Schmidt famously analyzed the criminal law as a preference-shaping
policy, suggesting that criminal laws seek to influence tastes or preferences
as much as to constrain opportunity. 60 While some have argued that even
limited decriminalization of computer crime makes preference shaping
inefficient or impossible, 61 this Part argues that preference shaping would
actually be enhanced by a limited, "safe harbor" decriminalization within
clear boundaries.
Since hacker culture has many antiauthoritarian strands, preference
shaping on a punishment model alone is unlikely to succeed. On its own,
the criminal law may strengthen the contours of a criminally deviant
subculture. Thus, positive incentives for lawful conduct, a necessary
component of decriminalization, must play an essential role in preference
shaping in order to reinforce the positive and law-abiding social meanings
latent in hacker culture.62 By drawing on the positive aspects of the "hacker
ethic," positive incentives can help develop socially beneficial preferences
within hacker communities.
A. Preference Shaping with Positive Incentives
The preference-shaping model requires that the regulator first identify
the preferred social mores before setting penalties and incentives to shape
preferences. Because the cost of preference shaping is so high, Dau-
Schmidt argues, it should only be used when society values one activity
highly and the other only minimally. 63 If preference shaping is to work, the
undesirable activity must be clearly prohibited. Hacking is clearly
prohibited by the criminal law. One might argue that even minimal
decriminalization would upset the clarity of the rules, making preference
shaping inefficient.
59. Gary Becker pioneered modem economic analysis of criminal deterrence, focusing on
whether a particular penalty and the enforcement of that penalty would deter commission of the
crime. See generally Becker, supra note 10.
60. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 21.
61. Calkins, supra note 18, at 203-09.
62. See Kahan, supra note 11, at 365-66, 380-83. Kahan argues that criminal law helps shape
social meaning and that criminal deterrence strategies based on high sanctions and a low
probability of capture reduce levels of cooperation with law enforcement. With computer crime,
where the applicable sanctions are relatively high and the probability of capture is low, a nonpenal
deterrence strategy may prove more fruitful than a strict punishment regime.
63. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 21, at 19-22.
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Decriminalization within clear boundaries, however, would not upset
the preference-shaping policy of the criminal law. Rather, to the extent that
the decriminalization program provides incentives for socially approved
behavior, it would enhance that preference-shaping function. Dau-Schmidt
recognizes the role that reward plays in shaping preferences.64 While his
primary concern is to understand the function of the criminal law, he
emphasizes various preference-shaping technologies, including positive
incentives. 65 Thus, preference shaping that is begun through criminalization
can be reaffirmed through positive reinforcement.
Dau-Schmidt is not alone in recognizing the deterrent and preference-
shaping power of positive incentives. Philosophy has not missed the point.66
Philosophers have recognized reward, like punishment, as an ex ante
deterrent to criminal behavior that encourages good conduct. 67 Empirical
research confirms this intuition. Social scientists have argued that threat of
punishment does not act as a strong deterrent for people who are criminally
motivated or morally uncommitted. 68 A more determinative factor is the
scale of the opportunity to earn rewards from criminal activities. 69 The
argument seems applicable to the computer-crime context, where, in the
absence of a sociomoral consensus on hacking, many actors remain morally
uncommitted. 70 In the hacker world, the threat of punishment may be
overshadowed by the expectation of psychic rewards-including
intellectual stimulation, the thrill of competition, and gains to self-esteem
64. Id. at 5.
65. Id. at 18 (describing the use of rewards and education to shape preferences and views
about particular behaviors); see also id. at 17 n.80 (listing a number of nonpunitive methods of
preference shaping).
66. Donald Clark Hodges, Reward, 19 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 198, 202-03
(1958) (noting that positive incentives can be used to encourage good conduct and enhance social
welfare).
67. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED 224-25 (Charles
Warren Everett ed., 1945) ("This punishment then, or this reward, whichever it may be, in order to
produce its effect must in some manner or other be announced: notice of it must in some way or
other be given, in order to produce an expectation of it, on the part of the people whose conduct it
is meant to influence."); DAVID HUME, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in
HUME'S MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 173, 194 (Henry D. Aiken ed., 1948) (arguing that,
in order to give incentives for production and accomplishment, "whatever is produced or
improved by a man's art or industry ought... to be secured to him"). Hume thus implicitly
regards reward less as a recognition of virtuous action than as a stimulus to such conduct.
68. Piliavin et al., supra note 20.
69. Id. at 114; cf W. Kip Viscusi, The Risks and Rewards of Criminal Activity: A
Comprehensive Test of Criminal Deterrence, 4 J. LAB. ECON. 317, 338-39 (1986) (noting the
impact of the potential financial rewards of criminal activity on decisionmaking).
70. See Mark D. Rasch, Criminal Law and the Internet, in THE INTERNET AND BUSINESS: A
LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES 141, 145, 164 (Joseph F. Ruh, Jr., ed., 1996)
(arguing that, for example, the problem of property in cyberspace admits of no easy legal or moral
answers, suggesting that "moral and legal structures break down in cyberspace," and implying that
no social consensus has yet emerged to categorize many activities on the web).
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and reputation derived from success.7 If this is the case, a preference-
shaping model grounded in positive incentives makes sense.
To the extent that criminal sanctions for computer crime are meant to
shape preferences by teaching specific behaviors, rewards may better
achieve that goal. Psychology posits that positive reinforcement results in
more effective learning than punishment. Whereas punishment often leads
the punished actor to feel subservient, rewards encourage feelings of
independence and may thus result in higher rates of rule compliance.72 By
appealing to hackers' sense of independence, a recognition that some kinds
of hacking are legitimate may thus shape preferences for these activities.
Finally, the psychology of human choice reinforces the importance of
positive incentives in decisionmaking processes. An influential
psychological study found that in choosing among options, we
simultaneously choose an option for its positive characteristics while
rejecting others for their negative qualities.73 Criminal law encourages us to
reject crime by emphasizing its negative consequences. But a consideration
of the negative only constitutes half of a decisionmaking process. By
framing a choice as one between an activity with negative consequences
and one with positive attributes, a balanced policy may more effectively
deter computer crime than does threat of criminal sanction alone.74 A
particular characteristic of hacker culture-its status as a subculture
relatively resistant to criminal sanctions-reinforces the need to add
positive incentives to the preference-shaping model in the computer-crime
context.
71. See Grabosky, supra note 3, at 3 ("The very fact that some activities in cyberspace are
likely to elicit official condemnation is sufficient to attract the defiant, the rebellious, or the
irresistibly curious.").
72. See generally Robert Eisenberger & Linda Rhoades, Incremental Effects of Reward on
Creativity, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 728 (2001) (arguing that external rewards can
enhance perceived self-determination, increase task interest, and create positive relationships). Cf
BRUNO FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF PERSONAL MOTIVATION
18 (1997) (arguing that if an intervention acknowledges an actor's intrinsic motivation, the
intervention will be perceived as supportive).
73. Edlar Shafir et al., Reason-Based Choice, 49 COGNITION 11, 15 (1993).
74. Once some kinds of hacking become acknowledged as socially legitimate, random
unauthorized access is likely to be considered as a more extreme activity than participating in
contests. Extremeness aversion predicts that within an offered set, options with extreme values are
relatively less attractive than those with intermediate values. Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky,
Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and Extremeness Aversion, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 281,
289-92 (1992) (describing the phenomenon of "extremeness aversion," whereby decisionmakers
choose the "moderate" option); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1181-82 (1997) (finding that framing a choice between a moderate and an extreme option
leads most actors to select the moderate course).
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B. Social Meaning in Hacker Culture
Legal responses to crime may be ineffective or worse if they do not
account for the social context in which they are applied and are not careful
about the social meaning that a particular penalty may convey in that
context. 75 Penalties for computer crime may thus have minimal effect to the
extent that hackers constitute a counterculture. Penalties might serve less as
a deterrent than as a challenge, something to boast about eluding. 6 Thus,
punishment alone may not be the best preference-shaping model in the
computer-crime context.
Sociologists have emphasized the adverse consequences of social
reactions generated by deviance.77 Labeling, the process of social
sanctioning along the lines of group identity, may alter identities in ways
that systematize and prolong deviance. Deviance labeling produces
changes in the actor's self-evaluation in which a deviant person reorganizes
the self around deviant values, identities, and activities.79  Broad
criminalization of hacking under the CFAA is much like labeling.
Sanctioning a broad category of conduct as criminal, especially when an
identifiable social group primarily engages in that conduct, may lead to
further deviance. 80 The Act's broad purview may help establish an
antiauthoritarian subcommunity, a cohesive group defined by its
commitment to "deviant" values. Standing alone, the criminal law may
undermine efforts to deter computer crime. To strengthen preference
shaping, positive reinforcement that draws on, rather than antagonizes,
hacker culture may be more appropriate and may enhance the preference-
shaping function of the criminal law.
We have remarked that, in order to effectively reduce crime, policies
must support the positive social norms that already exist within the
75. Kahan, supra note 11, at 378; Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 2385, 2445 (1997) ("When the law is out of step with the norms in a given community, and
it labels 'ordinary' citizens lawbreakers, the ability of the law to shape the behavior of that
community is compromised. The individual lawbreaker-whose reputation may even have been
enhanced by the skirmish with the police-is not as likely to heed a law-following message as a
resident of a community where the law tracks its norms.").
76. See Bendavid, supra note 19; Marc Rogers, A New Hacker Taxonomy 12, at
http://psyber.letifer.org/downloads/priv/hacker doc.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2003)
("Psychological theories of crime postulate that because a hacker sub-culture or sub-class exists,
and the activity is being reinforced ... , criminal hacking will not disappear on its own but will
continue to flourish if left unchecked." (citation omitted)).
77. See generally EDWIN M. LEMERT, SOCIAL PATHOLOGY: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO
THE THEORY OF SOCIOPATHIC BEHAVIOR (1951) (exploring the relationship between deviant
activities and the organized social responses that identify, label, and control such deviance).
78. See. e.g., L. Edward Wells, Theories of Deviance and the Self-Concept, 41 SOC.
PSYCHOL. 189, 192 (1978).
79. Id. at 193, 200.
80. Charles R. Tittle, Deterrents or Labeling?, 53 SOC. FORCES 399,408 (1975).
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specified community. 81 Such norms exist in hacker culture, though their
strength has waned. The Internet has diluted norms that were strong in the
original, homogenous, tightly knit hacker community. Hackers were
generally united by a code of ethics and a drive to understand technology.82
They held themselves to high standards of behavior and scorned those who
hacked maliciously.
83
This early "hacker ethic" included principles such as "access to
computers should be unlimited and total, 8 4 "[a]ll information should be
free,"85 and "do not intentionally damage any system. 86 Hackers did not
consider unauthorized access without malicious intent to be unethical.87 In
fact, many hackers believed hacking to serve a useful purpose by
uncovering security flaws and vulnerabilities. 88
81. Kahan, supra note 11, at 383-84 (arguing that "[tihe meaning a punishment expresses
counts as much as the disutility it imposes"); Katyal, supra note 75, at 2445.
82. Dorothy E. Denning, Concerning Hackers Who Break into Computer Systems 7-9 (Oct.
1, 1990), at http://www.cpsr.org/cpsr/privacy/crime/denning.hackers.html.
83. BILL LANDRETH, OUT OF THE INNER CIRCLE 19 (1985) ("We were explorers, not spies,
and to us, damaging computer files was not only clumsy and inelegant-it was wrong.");
Denning, supra note 82, at 7 ("Hackers say they are outraged when other hackers cause damage or
use resources that would be missed, even if the results are unintentional and due to
incompetence.").
84. STEVEN LEVY, HACKERS: HEROES OF THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION 27 (1984). Levy
described the emergence of a hacker code of ethics, listing its tenets:
(1) "Access to computers-and anything which might teach you something about the
way the world works should be unlimited and total."
(2) "All information should be free."
(3) "Mistrust Authority-Promote Decentralization."
(4) "Hackers should be judged by their hacking, not [by other] criteria .
(5) "You can create art and beauty on a computer."
(6) "Computers can change your life for the better."
Id. at 27-33; see also The Mentor, A Novice's Guide to Hacking-1989 Edition (Dec. 1988), at
http://www.undergroundnews.com/files/texts/underground/hacking/guide.htm. "The Mentor," one
of the members of the Legion of Doom hacking group, presents the following set of guidelines for
beginning hackers:
I. Do not intentionally damage any system.
I1. Do not alter any system files other than ones needed to ensure your escape from
detection and your future access ....
Ill. Do not leave your (or anyone else's) real name, real handle, or real phone
number on any system that you access illegally....
IV. Be careful who you share information with....
V. Do not leave your real phone number to anyone you don't know....
VI. Do not hack government computers....
VII. Don't use codes unless there is no way around it ....
VIII. Don't be afraid to be paranoid ....
LX. Watch what you post on boards ....
X. Don't be afraid to ask questions ....
XI. Finally, you have to actually hack ....
Id.
85. LEVY, supra note 84, at 27.
86. The Mentor, supra note 84.
87. See LEVY, supra note 84, at 27-28; Denning, supra note 82, at 7-8.
88. Some hackers view themselves as part of a consumer-advocacy group, discovering
security flaws in commercial network software and publishing it online. While the strategy may
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1590 [Vol. 1 12: 1577
Hack-In Contests and Computer Crime
The Internet has radically altered the social conditions that nurtured this
ethic. While today hackers are often depicted as isolated, nocturnal
individuals, early hackers tended to bond together in groups through which
their ethic was enforced. Before the Internet, private networks called
bulletin board systems hosted most hacking organizations. Generally led by
a hacker with power to accept or exclude others from the group, these
organizations were able to enforce norms. With a hierarchy based on
knowledge and expertise, the groups were headed by their most technically
proficient member, who tended to have gone through the norm-reinforcing
process.8 9 Those who violated norms were often rejected from the
organization.9" Widespread Internet use upset this socialization process.
Few web users now undergo any normative socialization, and hackers
freely surf the web, often posting their techniques online. 91
While a cohesive hacker community bound by ethical guidelines is no
longer dominant, remnants of the old "hacker ethic" remain. For example,
the hacking competitions sponsored by security firms promise large
rewards, but the hackers who participate stress that their aim is to improve
programming by exposing deficiencies in code.92 Some hackers are helping
law enforcement fight the war on terror out of a desire to put their skills to
productive use. 93 Finally, contrary to the standard image that security
professionals and hackers are enemies, the two camps come together for
Black Hat, the annual security conference, and DEFCON, the hackers'
result in increased hacking in the short term, such hackers argue that if they simply reported the
vulnerability to those responsible, the weakness would be swept under the rug. Bruce Gottlieb,
Hack, CounterHack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 34, 36 (reporting that Senators
Fred Thompson and Joseph Lieberman lauded one such group, LOpht, for performing an
important public service); see also Ellen Messmer, @Stake's Pitch: Hackers Are Your Friends,
NETWORK WORLD, Feb. 7, 2000, at http://www.nwfusion.com/news/2000/0207apps.html
(describing the security start-up @Stake, founded by Mudge, which employs hackers to test
corporate networks for vulnerabilities).
89. Lee et al., supra note 9, at 867.
90. Id. The social norms literature indicates that small communities, where individuals are
known, their activities are visible, and reputational sanctions arc frequent, arc the most likely
venue for norms to have effect. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 167 (1991)
(arguing that "members of a close-knit group develop and maintain norms whose content serves to
maximize the aggregate welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another");
Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901,
1922 (2000) ("Small communities are effective norm enforcers... because community members
all know one another and interact on an ongoing basis.... Moreover, sanctions are particularly
effective because in a small community, the potential norm violator is likely to value highly the
esteem of community members.").
91. Hacking techniques are disseminated through many high school and university computer
groups. Hacking magazines, like www.2600.com; hacking books, like
www.happyhacker.org/hhbook/toc.shtml; hacking websites, like www.phrack.org,
www.10pht.com, and www.zerberus.de/texte/ccc/ccc95/artikel/hackan_e.htm; and hacking search
engines, like www.astalavista.box.sk, are a source of much information.
92. See infra Section II.A.
93. Cyber Security: Hacking for a Higher Power?, NAT'L JOURNAL'S TECH. DAILY, Oct. 18,
2001, at http://nationaljoumal.com/members/search.
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shadow convention, annually separated only by a few days and a few
blocks. The conventions draw essentially the same crowd,94 and reports
note the hacker desire to build confidence in the high-tech infrastructure by
making code more secure.95 Something remains of the original ethical
principles.
Can these principles regain their normative force in the Internet age?
While Lessig believes that amorphous identities and the lack of physical
presence make regulation through social norms difficult in cyberspace,96
Katyal argues that law can entrench social norms by placing computers in
observable places and educating children about proper web behavior.97
While real-space policies could encourage positive social norms, we should
not forswear regulation through social norms via the Internet itself. The
confluence of contests, codes of ethics, and publicity campaigns, along with
real-space strategies, could cultivate positive social norms in cyberspace.98
The roots of the original hacker ethic are still present. Policies meant to
deter computer crime should be cognizant of these latent values. The use of
criminal punishment alone may contribute to their demise. The interaction
of positive incentives and punishments could revitalize and strengthen these
traditional norms, filling in gaps that the Internet has created.99 An effort
must be made to help rebuild a community of hackers in which a body of
positive social norms can be sustained. Contests can contribute to the norm-
rejuvenating process. After all, group interactions play an important role in
shaping normative definitions of acceptable behavior.'00
III. CONTESTS AND THE NEW HACKER
Although contests are an integral part of hacker culture, they have
untapped potential as a policy tool. This Part begins by describing how
hacker contests are currently used. It concludes by laying out a rough
contest framework that could deter computer crime. While law must
continue to impose sanctions upon cybercrime, private ordering can help
minimize the problem. The contest model responds to the insights of
94. Matthew Fordahl, Schmoozing with the Web Enemy, CHI. TRIB., Jul. 16, 2001, § 4, at 5.
95. Id.
96. LESSIG, supra note 8, at 14-17.
97. Katyal, supra note 8, at 1108-09; cf Cybercrime Hearing, supra note 27, at 22-23
(statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, FBI) (arguing that schools and workplaces must become
more conversant in an ethical discourse about computer use).
98. Pseudonymity for tournament participants may also contribute to the development of
positive hacker social norms. Insofar as pseudonyms allow for the accumulation of reputational
capital, they may help create social norms in the hacking tournaments that have spillover effects
beyond the contest context. See infra notes 162-166 and accompanying text.
99. See infra Section III.B.
100. Ronald L. Akers et al., Social Learning and Deviant Behavior: A Specific Test of a
General Theory, 44 AM. SOC. REV. 636, 638 (1979).
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preference-shaping theory, maintaining a clear prohibition on illegal
activities while providing incentives for socially approved hacking.
Privately sponsored contests can complement law both to deter computer
crime and to reap the benefits of legitimately victimless hacking.
A. The Prevalence of Hacker Competitions
Hacker competitions are common. At hacker conventions, attendees
frequently attempt to hack into each other's systems while protecting their
own.'' The security industry sponsors contests to perfect products,
challenging industry professionals to hack into servers.10 2 Most interesting
is the strategy that some security companies have taken in recent years. As
a means of advertising their products and endorsing them with a rigorous
public test, they have challenged hackers to crack their code.1 0 3 Sponsoring
a site secured by their software, the companies have promised rewards to
the first hackers able to breach security. 1 4 The contests are popular among
hackers. One contest last year logged almost 20,000 attacks. 105 The
companies carefully tailor their competitions to the participants'
motivations. They recognize the importance of "bragging rights" and
promote the tournaments to appeal to hackers' competitive spirit. More than
a passing fad, competitions are increasingly prevalent, 10 6 and some of them
101. Mathias Thurman, Security Manager's Visit to Def Con Is an Eye-Opener,
COMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 13, 2001, 3, at http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/
story/0,10801,62960,00.html.
102. Jennifer L. Rich, Brazilian Company Is Hacking Its Way up, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2001,
at C5 (describing the annual security industry hacking contest sponsored by the Sans Institute).
103. That a company can withstand hacker attacks is an effective endorsement. The website
of one security company, AntiOnline, is continuously targeted by hackers. AntiOnlinc, at
http://www.antionline.com/index.php (last visited Feb. 15, 2003). Its founder, John Vranesevich,
established the site as one that trumpeted hacker exploits, but that has changed since Vranesevich
started to pursue hackers as a security expert. That his site withstands the attacks is its biggest
selling point. Vranesevich has capitalized on the situation, including a feature visitors can use to
see who is trying to hack in at any particular moment. Mark Compton, Cybersleuth, SALON.COM,
May 27, 2000, at http://dir.salon.com/tech/view/2000/03/27/vranesevich/index.htm.
104. Maggie Shiels, Hackers Offered $lm To Reach Final Frontier, HERALD (Glasgow),
Apr. 18, 2001, at 21; Damien Pearse, Hackers Compete in High-Tech Cyber Contest, PRESS
ASS'N, Apr. 22, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wire Service Stories File; Uncompromised
$100,000 E-Security Challenge To Be Retired at DEFCON 2001, BUS. WIRE, June 28, 2001,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Business Wire File.
105. Uncompromised $100,000 E-Security Challenge To Be Retired at DEFCON 200], supra
note 104.
106. See, e.g., George V. Hulme, Hacking Contest Reveals Solaris Vulnerability, TECHWEB,
Apr. 26, 2001, at http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB20010425S00 9 ; Matt Loney, $100K
Hacking Contest Ends in Free-for-All, ZDNET NEWS, June 3, 2002, at
http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1105-930689.html; Stuart McClure & Joel Scambray, Hacking
Contest Spotlights Many Ways To Attack Web Sites, CNN.COM, Nov. 3, 1999, at
http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9911/03/hack.contest.idg/.
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are annual affairs.' °7 Companies continue to put contests to new uses. Early
last year, the search engine Google announced a programming contest to
develop software,' 0 8 and Microsoft challenged hackers in order to test its
software's security.
0 9
Hacker contests deserve greater attention than they have garnered in the
literature on computer crime. The market has turned hackers' competitive
motivations to productive use, both as an advertising strategy and as a
means of developing new products. The question arises whether the
contests could be harnessed in a more formal, institutionalized fashion.
Private industry stands to learn some lessons from the software market if it
hopes to deter computer crime. The following Section of this Note outlines
a proposed system of institutionalized contests or "hack-in days" sponsored
by private companies to channel hacker activity. Through a regular series of
contests, the Note argues, society can harness hacker motivations to deter
computer crime while gaining a number of social benefits.
The security challenges are not structured to serve this function. First,
although there are many contests, they remain infrequent. In order to
emphasize the difference between illegal hacking and hacking within a
contest's "safe harbor," a regular system of contests is necessary. Second,
the security contests' infrequency and lack of systemization fail to
discourage hitting other targets. With long lags between one contest and the
next, these competitions fail to engage hackers consistently and may result
in new "noise." By providing incentives to, and spawning interest in,
hacking without creating a consistent legal outlet for those activities, these
contests may increase overall hacking levels and may even attract new
people to hacking. 1 0 In the absence of an approved contest space that is
consistently available, these new hackers may engage in random hacking,
benign or otherwise, raising targets' security and monitoring costs. A
107. Linda Wertheimer & Jason Beaubien, Open Hack Competition Which Offers $50,000 to
Anyone Who Can Hack into a Fake E-Commerce Web Site Set Up for the Contest, Jan. 17, 2001,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, NPR File. DataFort recently sponsored its second annual contest.
DataFort, at http://hack.datafort.net (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
108. John Borland, Googly One: Search Site Offers Cash for Coding, CANBERRA TIMES, Feb.
11, 2002, at AI5.
109. Matthew W. Beale, Microsoft Issues Open Challenge to Hackers, E-COM. TIMES, Aug.
6, 1999, at http://www.ecommercetimes.comI/per/story/937.htmI.
110. Evidence indicates that instances of random hacking, as opposed to hacking within
specified boundaries, lead to more hack attacks. Suddenly aware of Internet vulnerabilities,
hacking victims themselves often begin to hack out of curiosity or out of a new awareness that
hacking is easy. For example, after one such victim had his home computer hacked, he began to
hack other computers, going so far as to contact his hacker for advice. See Peter Lewis, High-
Speed Internet Technologies Have Enabled an Increase of Electronic Security Risks for the
Public, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 12, 1999, at El. If infrequent contests raise the incidence of overall
random hacking activity by failing to provide a consistent outlet, one can imagine that this
behavior might cascade as more targets are hacked and subsequently take up hacking.
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system of frequent and well-publicized contests could absorb much of this
random hacking.
Third, the security contests are completely anonymous. The company
has a strong endorsement if it can claim that the most notorious hackers
failed to breach its security. While these conditions provide fodder for
advertisements, allowing companies to claim that their products withstood a
rigorous public test, they fail to differentiate between acceptable and
unacceptable hacking. The security contests implicitly sanction illegal
hacking. Without such hacking, security companies would have no market.
They stand to benefit from a hacking "arms race" and continued illegal
hacking.
Finally, a number of sites will not buy security products, and the
security contests may indirectly divert hackers toward those most
vulnerable sites. More than anything, the security-sponsored challenges
may be a warning to commercial site operators to buy protective software.
These complaints are easily summarized: The security contests make no
expressive statement about the difference between legal and illegal hacking.
By conflating the two, these contests do little to deter hacking. Contests can
be designed, however, to produce a new hacker ethic that will deter
computer crime.
B. A Proposed Framework for Hacking Contests
A contest designed to shape preferences and deter computer crime must
confront several essential issues. First, it must clearly demarcate socially
acceptable hacking from illegal hacking. If rewards and sanctions are to be
effective, they must mutually reinforce each other as part of an
interconnected whole. Second, for the reward to be an adequate incentive, it
has to be publicized and alluring enough to induce hackers to participate.
III
Attracting all types of hackers will be a great challenge, and a balance must
be struck in this regard-contests must be structured to be in the best
interests of hackers, companies, and deterrence. Government may have a
role to play to create these conditions. Finally, measures must be taken to
authenticate participants' identities without dissuading them from
competing. This Section seeks to develop a framework for thinking about
the issues and to suggest some directions the contests could take.
111. See BENTHAM, supra note 67, at 224-25 (discussing motives as necessary to the force of
law).
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1. The Model
To help deter criminal hacking, firms could create a series of "hack-in"
days, allowing hackers to hack their sites to expose vulnerabilities. The
contest could be designed as a game or as a more serious security exercise.
While the game model might not appeal to older hackers and would not
reinforce the old hacker principle of improving code, it may be an
appropriate educational tool for young hackers. Alternatively, the
sponsoring firm could stage a dummuiy site-on which sensitive information
would have been secured or removed-and invite hackers to break the
code. Design choices should take into consideration the targeted audience
and the intended goal.
A requirement of contest entry would be that the winners refrain from
publicly revealing how they cracked the site. 1 2 Another possibility would
be to require winners to repair the security holes they uncovered.
(Arguably, hackers would have an incentive to do a good job, since their
reputation would be on the line in the next competition involving that site.)
Despite evidence indicating that some hackers are interested in actually
creating secure networks as much as in deconstructing vulnerabilities, 13
this approach may not win hacker support. Alternatively, the contest could
be monitored as a "honeypot 1t4 so that winning methods could be recorded
and technological vulnerabilities repaired." 5 Sites should remove all
112. Firms could thus avoid the problem that arose when Princeton professor Edward W.
Felten won a contest by cracking digital music copy-protection schemes. Instead of claiming the
prize, Felten published a paper explaining how he broke the code. A "Speed Bump" vs. Music
Copying: Master Cryptographer--and Code Cracker-Edward Felten Says Technology Isn't the
Answer to Digital Copyright Violations, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Jan. 9, 2002, at
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jan2002/nf2OO2O19_7170.htm.
113. See, e.g., Gottlieb, supra note 88, at 35-36 (reporting a hacker's dismay at the suggestion
that he should actually "design a more secure version" rather than simply uncover and report
existing security flaws); Messmer, supra note 88 (describing a company run by hackers that tests
corporate networks for vulnerabilities and advises finns how to secure them).
114. Andrew Brandt, Decoy PCs Give Hackers a Security Lesson, CNN.coM, July 17, 2001,
at http://www.cnn.com/2001/TECHIntemet/07/17/honeynet.project.idg/index.html (describing
the benefits accruing to security experts from monitoring hackers' attempts to crack security
through a network of PCs dubbed "honeypots"-networked PCs in various states of security that
have been installed such that researchers can monitor attacks without being noticed by hackers);
Mathew Schwartz, Networks Use "Honeypots" To Catch an Online Thief CNN.COM, Apr. 4,
2001, at http://www.enn.com/200l/TECH/intemet/04/04/trap.a.thief.idg/index.html.
115. One of these or some analogous method will be essential to ensure that the contests
actually result in increasingly secure websites. Hackers are better placed than law enforcement, or
even Internet security professionals, to know how to make computer crime more difficult. Targets
must tap into hackers' knowledge to help design better computer systems and prevent crimes. As
Katyal explains:
Because cybercrime is so easy to commit, and much of the knowledge needed to make
it more difficult resides in private hands, government must devise methods to extract
such information from criminals .... The use of informants to help design better
computer systems and prevent crimes from occurring ... portends a proactive, not a
reactive, model of law enforcement.
Katyal, supra note 8, at 1034.
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proprietary and private information from the "open zone" so as not to
compromise themselves or their clients. Participating hackers might also be
required to sign a hacker code of ethics resembling the older codes. I 6 The
code should focus on values like learning, understanding code, helping to
create a secure technological infrastructure, and forswearing destruction.
An effective contest system must have regular and frequent
competitions. Firms should organize and cooperate, creating a calendar by
which different firms would take on the target role for different contests. As
noted below, all participating firms need not sponsor their sites for contests.
They may play other roles. Potential hacking victims already have
incentives to organize and develop strategies to deter computer crime, given
technical difficulties and the fact that law enforcement has proved
unreliable." 7 Firms are likely to gain from the cooperative exchange of
information and by mutually supporting efforts to deter computer crime,
since each instance of crime has system-wide effects.118 Participating firms
could contribute to a pool used to pay for the contests, including the
rewards offered, although monetary prizes may prove less necessary than
reputational and legitimation incentives to encourage hacker participation.
To reduce the cost to firms, government may play a role either by giving
tax benefits to participants or by lowering e-commerce insurance rates for
participating firms. 
19
While society would incur some deadweight loss from running the
competitions, the contests should generate benefits that justify the
expenditures. Computer crime cost about $250 million in 1998120 and
jumped to more than $375 million in 2001 .12 During this period, law
116. See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 84, at 27-36.
117. Michael E. O'Neill, Old Crimes in New Bottles: Sanctioning Cybercrime, 9 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 237, 281 (2000) ("Even otherwise natural competitors have an interest in
maintaining secure transactions because each player is potentially vulnerable to a cyber-attack.");
Ellen Messmer, Web Sites Unite To Fight Denial-of-Service War, NETWORK WORLD, Sept. 25,
2000, available at http://www.nwfusion.com/news/2000/0925userdefense.html.
118. O'Neill, supra note 117, at 281; Katie Hafner & John Biggs, In Net Attacks, Defining
the Right To Know, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2003, at G1.
119. The contests will be in the interest of past and potential targets of computer crime. In
addition to a smaller incidence of computer crime, government may provide some incentives to
participate. Participating firms may be rewarded by (1) receiving special tax breaks, and (2)
benefiting from stricter than average penalties for computer crimes committed against them,
resulting in greater deterrence. See Subsection III.B.2. As a negative sanction giving firms an
incentive to participate, government could further require nonparticipating firms to pay higher
Internet insurance premiums.
120. Crista Souza, High-Tech Crime down 75% Since 1996, ELECTRONIC BUYERS' NEWS,
Mar. 18, 1999, at http://ebnews.com/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD-2902875.
121. Thurston Hatcher, Survey: Costs of Computer Security Breaches Soar, CNN.COM, Mar.
12, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/TECH/Intemet/03/12/csi.fbi.hacking.report/index.html
(reporting that both the frequency and cost of computer security breaches had increased
dramatically between 1998 and 2001).
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enforcement expenditures increased 12 2 at the same time that the Internet
security industry experienced a boom. 123 In 2000, private companies spent
an estimated $300 billion in private enforcement efforts against hackers and
viruses. 124 The combined cost of computer crime and governmental and
private defense measures is exorbitant when measured against results. To
the extent that competitions channel hacking away from criminal conduct
and decrease cybercrime's cost to firms, contests should help pay for
themselves. Individual target firms would not absorb all of the costs of
developing a competition infrastructure. Just as a market has developed for
security software, a market would likely develop for designing and
promoting "hack-in" contests, creating competition and economies of scale.
2. The Role for Government
The argument thus far has focused on private, noncriminal measures to
deter computer crime. While private ordering can provide essential
supplements to deterrence via the criminal law, it may not generate these
measures on its own. Government must play a role in reducing the cost of
organizing contests. Four issues justify a limited role for government to
induce contest participation.
First, existing market incentives encourage firms to buy security
software and employ private investigators to attract customers and keep
electronic vulnerabilities out of the public eye. Firms already engaged in
these efforts may be reticent to support hacking tournaments. This is a
collective action problem since, if the contests are to be effective, a number
of participants are necessary. By subsidizing and helping to design the first
contests, or even providing tax breaks or insurance subsidies to firms that
participate, 125 government can overcome the collective action problem and
make participation cheaper for firms.
Second, the failure of law enforcement to deter computer crime has led
to the privatization of enforcement.12 6 Security firms that track hackers
without publicizing either the pursuit or identification of the culprit are an
attractive alternative to police intervention, both because they are effective
122. Scott Harris, Ashcroft Sets Sights on Cybercrime, CNN.COM, July 24, 2001, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/TECH/internet/07/24/cyber.sheriff.idg/index.html.
123. Geoffrey Nairn, Secrets of Security Success, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2001, Special Section,
at 2 ("In an IT industry laid low by profit warnings and lay-offs, internet security is seen as one of
the few bright spots due to the supposedly recession-proof qualities of the sector.").
124. Anthony Shadid, Fight Against Cybercrime Stalls as Focus Stays on "Putting Out
Fires, " BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 21, 2001, at DI.
125. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
126. Rustad, supra note 5, at 100-02 (arguing that law enforcement has failed to keep pace
with cybercrime and that private enforcement is rapidly growing to fill this gap).
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and because they do not expose firms to market punishment.127 While these
private mechanisms help individual firms, they do not provide general
social deterrence. Government may play a role in encouraging mechanisms
of deterrence with more generalized social value, like competitions.
Third, the details of the competitions are important. Government might
implement baseline regulations so that contest designs do not produce crime
instead of deterrence. For example, the space opened to hack-in contests
must be strictly controlled so that proprietary information is not
endangered. To prevent this and other potential harms from arising from the
contest, government can set standards, perhaps in the form of guidelines
issued by the Attorney General, with which all federally recognized
contests must comply.
Finally, government must play a role because the tournaments' success
depends on private and public coordination. Criminal penalties and penalty
enhancements must reinforce the contest structure. Three policies would
contribute to this mutual reinforcement. First, Congress should maintain
strong criminal penalties outside of the contest context. Second, Congress
should enact penalty enhancements for those who participate in a contest
and are later convicted of computer crime. Finally, Congress should also
enact penalty enhancements for illegal hacking on sites that are contest
participants. This last policy would provide a further incentive for firms to
participate.
Two approaches to penalizing attacks on contest participants are
possible. First, contest participants could choose whether or not to post
warnings that penalty enhancements apply to hacking on their sites. (The
enhancements would not apply to hacking on nonparticipating sites, which
should be distinguished from both contest sponsors and participants that
play supporting roles.) Keeping some precautions unobservable-allowing
the enhancement to apply even where the participant did not post a
warning would produce social benefits. If hackers were aware that
enhanced penalties applied to hacking on some sites but could not
determine which sites carried the greater risk, hackers could not be selective
when choosing targets and would likely be more generally deterred than if
they could clearly identify the riskiest sites.' 28 While this "invisibility"
approach would provide general deterrence, it could result in severe
penalties for the unwary.
127. Friedman & Bissinger, supra note 5, at 2 (noting that notifying the authoritics advertises
the company's vulnerability to hackers); Rustad, supra note 5, at 100 ("Private enforcement in the
form of 'E-cops' is already becoming well established on the Internet, as many American Internet
companies are skeptical about the role of government in detecting and punishing hackers.").
128. For more discussion on invisible precautions and generalized deterrence, see infra notes
141-143 and accompanying text.
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A second approach avoids overpenalizing the unsophisticated by
placing warnings on all participating websites. Nonparticipating sites would
not be prohibited from posting warnings, however, and may even be
encouraged to do so. As a matter of self-interest, nonparticipating sites
should have an adequate incentive to post a warning. Widespread use of
such warnings should both produce general deterrence and increase the
quantum of site-specific deterrence for each individual site that posts a
warning, whether or not it has participated in the contests. Government
should encourage participating and nonparticipating sites alike to post
warnings by making these incentives known, communicating them to
website managers and firms. Sites could then choose to participate in the
contests as sponsors or supporting partners, to post a warning, or to do
nothing at all. What is important is that they make an informed choice.
In order to be effective, the warnings must have essentially similar
language. Firms that have participated in the contests would likely prefer to
have specific warnings stating that enhancements apply to hacking on their
sites. If nonparticipating sites could only post warnings in more general
language, hackers could distinguish participating from nonparticipating
sites and general deterrence would be lost. Thus, government should
encourage all firms to use severe warning language and could even draft
boilerplate warnings that all sites could use.
12 9
Government could more actively encourage sites to post warnings,
considering the general social value that would result from widespread
posting. Since sites would already have an adequate incentive to post
warnings that require negligible costs, however, government need not
provide further incentives. Simply communicating the incentives to sites
should be sufficient. This approach may, however, have some undesirable
consequences. The strongest argument in favor of instituting a posting
requirement is that, if posting is not uniform, hackers may substitute toward
sites that do not have warnings. These sites are likely to be predominantly
small, unsophisticated, and perhaps unaware that they may be targeted by
129. That government would encourage sites to post misleading warnings-warnings that
mislead hackers to believe that penalty enhancements will apply to hacking on a particular site-
would not create a problem of false advcrtising or false statement. Rules on false advertising are
designed to regulate statements about commodities and employment in order to protect consumers
and employees. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1998) (prohibiting false statements in connection
with commercial transactions that are likely to mislead consumers). The paradigmatic dangers
underlying false advertisement-taking advantage of the unwary, the innocent, and the misled-
are not implicated by the false warnings at issue here. The warnings would not encourage anyone
to buy a product that has been misrepresented. Rather, they would seek to deter criminal behavior.
Far from undermining the policy that animates regulation of false advertising, government
encouragement of these warnings would reinforce it, protecting consumers from being harmed by
illegal hacking. Moreover, rather than penalizing hackers unfairly, the warnings would provide
heightened notice of the penal consequences that could result from hacking activities.
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hackers. 130 To avoid this risk, government could institute a posting
requirement, requiring all sites to use the same general warning language.
Three categories of actors would thus post warnings: (1) contest
sponsors, (2) "hidden" suppoiting partners who have not actually sponsored
a contest, and (3) sites that have not participated in the contests in any way.
The enhancement would only apply to hacking on those sites that have a
visible warning and are actual participants--categories (1) and (2). Under
this "facade visibility" approach, government could both give unwary
hackers fair warning about penalty enhancements and provide general
deterrence by failing to clearly distinguish protected from unprotected sites.
While the burden to add postings would fall on individual sites in the
absence of a posting requirement, these sites would have an adequate
incentive to do so or to advertise themselves to hackers as preferable
targets.
The CFAA should be amended to encompass these enhancements for
crimes committed by or against contest participants. A number of activities
are already criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a), including knowingly
accessing a computer and obtaining information that has been determined
by the government to require protection for reasons of national defense or
foreign relations, intentionally accessing a computer and obtaining
restricted information, illegally accessing government computers, accessing
a protected computer with intent to defraud, damaging computer networks,
trafficking in passwords, and threatening to cause damage to a protected
computer. In addition to those activities already criminal under the Act,
subsection (a) should be amended to include the following language so that
illegal hacking in relation to contests is explicitly punishable:
(a) Whoever-
(8)(A) having participated in a registered online hacking contest
commits any of the violations listed under subsection (a); or
(B) whether or not they have participated in a registered online
hacking contest, commits any of the violations listed under
subsection (a) against an individual or entity that has participated
as a sponsor or a supporting partner in any such contest and
posted a clearly visible statement to that effect on its website;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section.
130. To the extent that hackers are motivated by challenge or reputation, however, such sites
may not be attractive targets. Cf Louise Kehoe, Hackers Hit AOL Cybervirgins, FIN. TIMES, June
30, 1997, at 3 (noting that AOL users had been targeted in a string of hacking attacks "because the
easy-to-use online service appeals to new and relatively unsophisticated internet users").
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These new provisions would both protect contest sponsors and deter
contest participants from engaging in random hacking by specifically
criminalizing hacking with a contest nexus. Penalty enhancements should
attach to such hacking to emphasize the "safe harbor" nature of the
contests. Subsection (c) of 18 U.S.C. § 1030 currently provides for a fine,
imprisonment, or both for violations of the Act. These penalties are of
varying severity depending on the provision violated. Subsection (c) could
be amended to include the following language targeting hacking with a
contest nexus:
(c) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) or (b) of
this section is-
(5) a penalty enhancement, not more than doubling the statutory
penalty, in the form of an increased fine, increased imprisonment,
or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(8)(A) or
(a)(8)(B) of this title.
Finally, to ensure that the contest designs are adequately tailored to
produce deterrence, the government should create standards with which the
contests must comply. Current subsection (e) of § 1030, which defines the
terms used in the statute, would become subsection (f), and new subsection
(e) would read:
(e) In order for the provisions of this section to apply, online
hacking contests shall be registered in accordance with guidelines
issued by the Attorney General.
Government cooperation is necessary to create the conditions under
which contests can successfully enhance the criminal law, and these
amendments to current law should ensure that the contests effectively deter
crime.
As argued above, on its own, government action has produced little
deterrence in the context of computer crime. Government can enhance the
contests' deterrent effect, however, by reducing the cost of organizing
contests, regulating contest design, and creating linkages between contests
and the criminal law. Put more simply, government can play a supporting
role, acting as a catalyst to help private actors deter computer crime.
131
131. William A. Reinsch, Under Secretary ofCommerce, stated:
With respect to prevention and the development of more comprehensive security
measures, the government can best play a supporting role. The infrastructure at risk is
owned and operated by the private sector. Inevitably, it will be they who must work
together to take the steps necessary to protect themselves.
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While private parties must take steps to deter hacking, government has a
role to play to ensure that private ordering is effective.
3. Rewards and Penalties
Much of the economic literature on crime focuses on the probability of
punishment.132 One might argue that the reward model, offering status
incentives and monetary prizes to contest winners, is flawed because the
number of winners could never match the number of hackers who are
caught. From this perspective, the relatively low probability of reward
would not have much deterrent effect. The argument ignores those hackers
who would be content with a legitimate venue for hacking and for whom
the contests would provide a satisfying alternative to illegal hacking. As for
hackers concerned with peer recognition, the argument is vulnerable on two
counts. First, the probability of capture for a computer crime is already
quite low, minimizing the deterrent power of criminal sanction. Thus, even
a small probability of reward may be as much a deterrent as the probability
of being punished.'33 Moreover, empirical studies indicate that low
probabilities are often conceptually inflated, explaining why people are
willing repeatedly to play the lottery.1
34
Second, one can design a model where the probability of winning is not
low. Each contest could be split into a number of parts with a winner
designated for each component. Alternatively, the contest could be timed,
with the top ten finishers declared winners. In either case, a cumulative
ranking system of the top 100 or 200 hackers could be posted on a
centralized site to give hackers a psychic incentive to compete even if they
cannot be the winner. With either system, winners' names must be
published promptly. While winners will also receive monetary rewards, or
perhaps even jobs, 135 emphasis should be placed on an effective campaign
The government can help. We can identify problems and publicize them. We can
encourage planning, promote research and development, convene meetings. In short,
we can act as a catalyst.
See Cybercrime Hearing, supra note 27, at 38.
132. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 10.
133. See Tittle, supra note 80, at 405 (arguing that behavior can be influenced "by fear of
punishment or anticipation of reward produced by observing others being punished or rewarded").
134. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, SCI. AM., Jan.
1982, at 160, 164.
135. The security-contest sponsors learned quickly the importance of tailoring the prize to the
audience. See supra notes 104-107 and accompanying text. While rewards should focus on
bragging rights, other incentives could also be employed. In addition to monetary rewards,
contests could be structured as a hiring mechanism. See Daffyd Roderick Manila, Hacker's
Paradise, TIME ASIA, Apr. 16, 2002, at http://www.time.com/time/asia/digital/magazine/
0,9754,105665,00.html (describing how Filipinos with technical expertise resort to computer
crime because they cannot find technology jobs); Thurman, supra note 101 (noting the
willingness of one security manager to hire hacker talent). The socially legitimating function of
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to publicize their names or pseudonyms. (As argued below, although it is
essential to verify identity for administrative purposes, hackers could create
their own contest identities.) An advertising strategy that persuasively
characterizes these rankings not only as an accurate but as the definitive
reflection of hacker skill would strengthen the contest's force.
It is important to emphasize that the contests should not replace
criminal sanctions. Punishment must be integrated with positive incentives,
and the interaction between the two will deter computer crime. Punishments
are necessary to ensure that reputational gains derived from the contest are
only available to participants. It is essential that the contests become the
sole, or at least the primary, source of hacking reputation and bragging
rights. Defectors who seek bragging rights outside of the contests must be
given a negative incentive. 3 6 The criminal law should not only penalize
crimes connected to contests, however. It should also create shaming
techniques designed to delegitimize hackers who brag about their illegal
exploits. 13 7 While these proposals will not enhance enforcement, the law's
expressive function is most important in this context. The goal is that
criminal hacking should no longer be associated with reputation as a skillful
hacker. As long as the criminal law reduces the psychic benefits derived
from illegal hacking, creating a stigmatizing effect, high enforcement levels
are not necessary. Publicity campaigns encouraging hackers who seek
prestige to participate in contests may compensate for suboptimal
enforcement. In this manner, reward and punishment would work together
to deter computer crime.
Penalty enhancements are a key element of the proposal. Social
scientists have advocated keying the severity of punishment to the level of
victim precautions,138 and legal scholars have developed a theory of when
sentencing enhancements should apply.1 39 Katyal argues that enhancements
are justified when targeted at harmful applications of conduct or
technologies that have "dual uses." 140 Contests create a dual use situation-
hacking is viewed as socially beneficial within a demarcated space and
hacking in specially demarcated spaces should be an incentive for hackers who see themselves as
providing a public good.
136. For discussion of penalties for hacking outside of the contest framework, see supra
Subsection III.B.2.
137. In addition to being fined or imprisoned, those convicted of computer crime in
connection with a contest could be shamed. The Justice Department could maintain a website
(linked to popular hacking websites) posting hackers who have been caught and prosecuted to
show that the contests are a better source of prestige than illegal hacking. See infra text
accompanying notes 198-199 (describing how bragging about extra-contest hacking often leads to
identification and prosecution).
138. See Omi Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for Private
Precautions Against Crime, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 434, 444 (1995) (arguing that where victims
have not taken adequate precautions, criminal punishment should be lighter).
139. See Katyal, supra note 8, at 1061-63.
140. See id.
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criminal outside that space. When hackers attack participating sites or
participate in contests themselves before committing unauthorized
intrusions, they abuse the trust that is established by the contest and
desanctify a space created to cultivate social norms. The penalty
enhancement is one means of ostracizing those who interrupt the process of
norm reconstruction.
Applying differential penalties depending on the victim's behavior-
whether or not they have sponsored a contest-raises the
visibility/invisibility question. 41 If only firms that actually sponsor contests
benefit from the enhanced penalties, the rule may cause substitution
effects-hackers may simply choose other targets. 142 Allowing some firms
to be invisible partners may have more general deterrent effects. If a hacker
cannot be sure whether hacking into a particular firm would carry a greater
penalty, he may be deterred more than by clearly labeled risky targets. 143 As
noted above, however, such a rule may result in overpenalizing
unsophisticated hackers. 44  Contests can fairly accommodate this
invisibility interest through the "facade visibility" approach that encourages
all sites, whether participants or not, to post a warning that a severe penalty
enhancement may apply for attacks on that site.145 Under this approach, the
consortium of participating firms could play a number of roles. Not all
firms need to sponsor their site as the locus of the contest-they could
provide funding, technological expertise, and the like as silent partners.
Hacking into any of these firms' sites would trigger the penalty
enhancement as long as they had posted warnings. For these specially
tailored legal sanctions to work properly, however, the enhancements, as
well as the fact that "hidden partners" and dummy warnings exist, must be
clearly publicized.
Facade visibility achieves the same policy goal as invisibility by
shifting the baseline. Rather than beginning with uniform lack of warning
and relying on unobservable precautions to provide general deterrence, with
facade visibility most actors would have visible warnings while only some
actually would have taken precautions. In both cases, hackers would face
141. See Ben-Shahar & Harel, supra note 138, at 452 (noting that where victim precautions
are unobservable, criminals cannot be as selective and run the risk of targeting a protected victim,
which results in greater deterrence).
142. See Katyal, supra note 75, at 2387.
143. Applying penalty enhancements for those who hack into invisible contest partner sites
would not present a Fifth Amendment due process problem. Hackers would already be aware that
hacking into the site is a criminal act. Thus, there is no notice issue as to the substantive crime
itself, only the magnitude of the penalty, which does not rise to the level of a due process concern.
Compare Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126, 138-39 (1998) (declining to apply the
rule of lenity and to construe a penalty-enhancement provision in favor of the defendant), with
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987) (construing an ambiguous substantive
criminal statute narrowly and in favor of the defendant).
144. See supra Subsection III.B.2.
145. See supra Subsection 1lI.B.2.
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uncertainty, could not be selective in choosing targets, and would run the
risk of targeting a protected victim. Such uncertainty should produce
significant general deterrence.
Invisibility and facade visibility create their own difficulties. One side
effect might be to cause crime of a different sort. For example, if hidden
technology such as LoJack reduces the incidence of car theft, Seven-Eleven
robberies may increase. 146 While invisible risk may encourage hackers
motivated by profit to engage in other crimes where the level of risk is more
apparent, the contest model accounts for the substitution possibility with
respect to unauthorized access by providing its own legal substitution. If the
contest is properly designed, the utility a hacker derives from participating
in it should be at least equal to that derived from unregulated hacking. At
the same time that it creates a legal channel for the prohibited behavior, the
contest attempts to create preferences for that legal conduct over illegal
computer crimes. Thus, a contest that allows a number of potential victims
to keep their precautions unobservable will likely produce deterrence that is
socially beneficial without causing target diversion or substitution of more
serious crimes.
As noted above, penalty enhancements should be well publicized.
Strengthened penalties are meant to enfeeble the "black market" where
participants might develop hacking expertise or put their skills to illicit
uses. These measures could be strengthened by a "three strikes" rule.
Hackers implicated in a specified number of offenses would not be able to
compete. To prevent some hackers from being locked out entirely, a date
could be set so that everyone would begin with a blank slate. Alternatively,
hackers could take away a strike for each public interest job they do (as
long as they do not add any new strikes), such as beefing up a site's security
or turning state's evidence to prosecute other crimes.
4. Who Will Participate?
One of the toughest questions contest developers must confront is the
question of who will participate. Hack-in contests should offer hackers a
legal outlet that responds to a number of the factors that motivate them. A
comprehensive study by the Boston Consulting Group recently surveyed
hackers to determine the most common motivations. 147 Hackers identified
intellectual stimulation and improving computer skills as the top two
146. See Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable
Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of LoJack, 113 Q.J. ECON. 43 (1998). Ayres and
Levitt's work measures whether the LoJack auto-theft device increases the commission of other
crimes, such as robbery.
147. Karim R. Lakhani et al., The Boston Consulting Group Hacker Survey 12 (July 24,
2002), t.; http://www.osdn.comibcg/BCGHACKERSURVEY-0.73.pdf.
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motivating factors. 148 Anecdotal evidence indicates that hackers are also
motivated by a competitive urge to earn peer recognition and bragging
rights. 149 Hack-in contests should create a legally structured space that
accounts for each of these motivations. In the contests, hackers could
pursue their curiosity and build skills. As noted above, the contests could
also be structured to provide a source of reputation and bragging rights.
Hackers might have a more positive attitude toward these contests than
toward sanctions, which they may take pleasure in flaunting."5 ° Whatever
the motivation, targeting young hackers at developmental stages is wise.151
The contests should target seasoned hackers as well. Appealing to
reputation has the potential to rehabilitate experienced hackers. Those who
hack out of either curiosity or to build computer skills could also find
satisfaction in the contests without resorting to criminal activities. Contests
would not provide a viable substitute for all hacking, however. Politically
or profit-motivated hacks would not be deterred. As noted in the
Introduction, the contest is tailored to directly deter simple unauthorized
access, not these other forms of computer crime.
Security contest sponsors have faced two serious issues in motivating
hackers to participate, though neither concern implicates hackers seeking a
legitimate venue for hacking. First, criminal-minded hackers might not
want to help the security industry by participating in such a contest.
52
148. Id.
149- See TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 59 (finding that hackers seek peer recognition and
respect). Hackers are renowned braggers. A number of newsgroups, particularly alt.2600.hackers,
are frequented by hackers bragging about their accomplishments. See, e.g., ERIC S. RAYMOND,
Homesteading the Noosphere, in THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND
OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 65, 89 (2001) ("Having established that
prestige is central to the hacker culture's reward mechanisms... [t]he best brag is code that 'just
works', and that any competent programmer can see is good stuff."), available at
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue3_ 10/raymond/; Bruce Sterling, Good Cop, Bad Hacker,
WIRED-MAG., May 1995, at 122, 124 ("Hackers will also talk to journalists. Hackers brag all the
time."). Law enforcement often captures culprits because they have bragged. Ariana Eunjung Cha
& John Schwartz, More Big Web Sites Hit by Hackers, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2000, at El (quoting
a security industry employee who stated that most criminal hackers are caught because they
cannot resist bragging); Sascha Segan, Tracking "'Mafiaboy's" Steps, ABCNEWS.COM, Apr. 20,
2000, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/tech/DailyNews/webattacksOO0420.html (quoting
Quebec Inspector Yves Roussell, who stated that hackers "like to brag about their capability, their
exploit[s]; they like to tell the public what they did").
150. See, e.g., Bendavid, supra note 19 (describing hackers' taunts as they evade law
enforcement).
151. See John Van Beveren, A Conceptual Model of Hacker Development and Motivations,
1 J. E-BuS. 1 (Dec. 2001), at http://www.ecob.iup.edu/jeb/December200l-issue/
Beveren%20article2.pdf (tracing the development of new hackers and charting their motivations
from tool kit/newbies into either cyberpunks or old-guard type hackers and finding that, as young
hackers develop skill and experience, unauthorized intrusion committed by tool kit/newbies
appears to be a gateway activity that could lead to either malicious or nonmalicious hacking).
152. Wertheimer & Beaubien, supra note 107.
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Second, hackers who want bragging rights may wait until a site is declared
invincible before trying to crack it, hoping to earn greater notoriety.1 53
As for the first issue, unlike the security contests meant to help sell
products, the proposal here need not be framed as a boon to any industry.
The contests should be characterized as a tool to increase Internet security
generally, a goal with which many hackers are sympathetic. Skillful
advertising should also present the contest as the definitive measure of
hacker skill, emphasizing the rankings. It should stress that the best hackers
in the world compete, prompting those who resist to participate out of
hubris. These techniques would hopefully attract even the cleverest hackers
who might otherwise be reluctant to participate.' 54 Tough penalties and
penalty enhancements may deter much of the postcontest, extralegal
hacking, decreasing the chance that some hackers will wait until the
tournament concludes to hack into the site.
While some hackers may find the contests overly artificial, private
hack-in contests have elicited massive participation rates. In contrast to the
counterculture point that participating in a contest could be seen as "selling
out," a private contest last year received 20,000 attempts.' 55 These numbers
suggest that, if the contest is adequately challenging and involves real
software or real networks, many hackers will be interested.
Anecdotal evidence reinforces the numbers, indicating that these
competitions may actually appeal to hackers. One commentator contends
that, given a legitimate venue or permission to hack, many hackers would
not engage in illegal hacking.' 56 Indeed, one hacker argues that, if hackers
are given legitimate access to systems in order to explore and learn, "it
would curb the urge to break into other sites." 157 The fact that the contest
creates a legitimate hacking venue is essential. For many hackers, this
legitimized space may be enough to turn them from illegal and socially
deleterious hacking to hacking that has social benefits." 8
153. Id.
154. See Hackers Invited To Crack Newest Security System, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 16, 2001, § 1, at
8 (noting that dangerous hackers often opt not to enter the security contests and have little interest
in sharing their ability to break into sites).
155. Uncompromised $100, 000 E-Security Challenge To Be Retired at DEFCON 2001, supra
note 104.
156. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 53 (referencing an e-mail interview with Dr. Fred Cohen).
157. Id. at 55 (quoting an interview with Chris Goggans).
158. The hack-in contest proposal is analogous to the approach a number of cities have
adopted to deal with gang-related graffiti-creating mural programs to channel youth artistic
talent into a product with community benefits. The first mural program in the country, in
Philadelphia, enlisted young graffiti artists to replace graffiti with murals on condition that they
agreed no longer to deface property. Jennifer Brown, Philadelphia Murals Are Biographies of Its
Neighborhoods, CHI. TRrB., Oct. 30, 2000, § 5, at 2; Sue Halpern, The Art of Change, MOTHER
JONES, July-Aug. 2002, at 30, 32. By 1991, seven years after the program's birth, less than one
percent of the Philadelphia murals had been vandalized. Michel Marriott, Public Art Tackles
Graffiti, and Wins, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1991, at A14. The program has been replicated in a
number of other cities, including San Diego, see City of San Diego, at
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Apart from the question of how to attract hackers, there remains the
issue of who should be allowed to compete. Ex-felons, those under criminal
suspicion, those under indictment, and convicted criminals serving jail time,
one might argue, should not be allowed to participate. 159 If any participants
would be prone to developing skills that will be put to impermissible uses,
this class of hackers runs the greatest risk. Judgment on the issue turns on
the assessment of tournaments themselves. If they perform their intended
functions, they will both create preferences for socially approved hacking
and deter criminal activity. While the strongest impression is likely to be
made on young hackers in their formative years, competitions have
rehabilitative potential as well.1 60 If, on the other hand, one views
competitions as the breeding ground for cybercrime networks, criminal
elements might best be excluded from participation.
161
Some security companies have made their contests anonymous. Last
year, one company, in an effort to attract hackers, stated that the first hacker
to succeed would simply find a bank account number waiting for him. 162 A
company more interested in advertising than nurturing social norms can
afford to do this. Anonymity would not be desirable in the contest model
proposed here, though pseudonymity is essential. 63 Pseudonyms are
already prevalent in hacker culture, 1 64 so adopting them in competitions
should not prove difficult.
http://www.sannet.gov/graffiti/school.shtml (last visited Dec. 29, 2002), Santa Fe, see City of
Santa Fe Arts Comm'n, at www.cominguptaller.org/profile-add/pr-addO2.htm (last visited Dec.
29, 2002), and Jersey City, see Pro Arts, at http://www.nices.com/proarts/mural.html (last visited
Dec. 29, 2002), The sheer number of cities that have initiated mural programs is indicative of the
programs' success, not only at reducing graffiti, but also at providing other, intangible benefits to
urban environments. These successes suggest that, arguments about counterculture aside,
programs designed to channel creative talents into constructive activities can replace, to a large
extent, the destructive uses to which those talents had previously been put. The experiences of
these cities indicate that hack-in contests, if well designed, can harness hackers' talents and put
them to good uses by both engaging hacker interest and providing them with reputational payoffs.
159. The argument is stated here in its simplest terms. A more nuanced statement would take
into consideration the kind of felony committed and the potential danger that could arise from
allowing a particular class of felons to engage in permitted hacking. Prohibiting ex-felons or
criminal suspects from participating in the contests may also raise the ex post facto issue,
160. To the extent that hackers seek social legitimation, peer recognition, or both, the contests
could persuade these hackers to forgo criminal hacking.
161. See infra Section IV.B. Those hackers involved with the criminal justice system would
already have some incentive to avoid illegal hacking outside of the competitions. They are more
likely to be closely monitored and penalties are likely to be more severe the second or third time
around.
162. Shiels, supra note 104.
163. Obtaining information about the person responsible for harmful behavior is impossible
in an anonymous framework. Moreover, anonymity presents a moral hazard. Because individuals
do not bear the reputational costs of their behavior, the aggregate amount of harmful behavior
may increase. David G. Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity,
Pseudonymity, and Limited Liability in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 142.
164. Rogers, supra note 76 (noting that hackers often use nicknames from science fiction or
fantasy, reflecting the use of the computer as a means of escapism).
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Compared to anonymity, pseudonyms "permit[] the accumulation of
reputational capital and 'goodwill' over time in the pseudonym itself. 165
Pseudonymity must be regulated in the competitions, however, because its
benefits depend on the development of the name in an historical context. 66
A nongovernmental third party, bound by strict privacy rules, could screen
participants to ensure consistent use of a single pseudonym. Participants
would only be required to reveal their pseudonyms, not their real names.
Pseudonyms could help constitute a positive online identity that provides
context-specific reputational effects as well as carry-over benefits beyond
the contest. In other words, pseudonyms can contribute to the creation of
positive social norms within the hacking community. Accumulation of
reputational capital through pseudonyms is essential for bragging rights and
criticism to be effective. Contest participants will build a reputation for skill
that adheres to their chosen contest identity or pseudonym. While social
legitimation may be enough to induce those hackers who would prefer to
hack in legal venues to participate, this aspect of reputational capital, along
with cash prizes, constitutes one of the primary incentives for hackers to
compete. The combination of incentives and penalties described above,
along with the benefits of pseudonymity, should allow for an inclusive
participant list.
Efforts could also be made to encourage team participation in contests.
The goal would be to decrease the Internet's isolating effect on hackers and
to help reestablish the communal networks of the early hacker
organizations. To the extent that such organizations could be supported
through contests, positive norms and ethics could once again be reinforced
through integrated social processes.
5. Authenticating Identity
In order for the contests to employ reputational incentives properly,
participating firms must authenticate competitors' identities. Competing
hackers who are able to "steal identities" would undermine the contests'
legitimacy. While emphasizing bragging rights will give many hackers an
incentive to be forthcoming with their identities, a digital signature along
the lines Lessig describes would be useful. 167 A nongovernmental third
party could be entrusted with issuing digital identification cards. Even
vigilante hackers could register, provided that government would not have
access to their information. The third party would be responsible for
determining the participants' eligibility, and only the pseudonym would be
165. Post, supra note 163, at 142.
166. Id. at 154. If hackers could adopt different contest pseudonyms at will, the reputational
value ofpseudonymity would be lost.
167. See LESSIG, supra note 8, at 39.
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transferred to the contest sponsor. As a final disincentive to identity
falsification, participants discovered to have used fake identification should
be prosecuted.
C. Summary
The proliferation of hacker competitions, both in hacker culture and as
a tool of the technology industry, suggests that such competitions may have
broader uses. Competitions may be relevant as a deterrent strategy to
complement the criminal law. If competitions are to deter crime effectively,
however, they must be carefully designed. Government may have a role to
play, among other things, in reinforcing the contests with strong protections
of contest sponsors and strict penalties on participants who engage in
random hacking. A carefully designed contest should produce deterrence
consistent with preference-shaping theory while capturing the benefits of
limited decriminalization.
1V. EVALUATING THE CONTEST PROPOSAL
A. Comparing Contests with the "Duty To Report"
The contest proposal can capture the benefits of decriminalization while
leaving the criminal law intact. These benefits are abundant. First, as
hackers hack into contest sites, they will identify latent security flaws. The
contests should be structured so that hackers are challenged to find such
flaws. Once weaknesses have been identified, participating firms will repair
the sites, ratcheting up Internet security. One can imagine a virtuous circle
as hackers identify ever-smaller flaws in increasingly secure sites.
Participating firms may even gain the advantage of claiming to consumers
that their sites, having been subjected to rigorous testing, are the most
secure.
Second, as contests help to disaggregate the hacker community and to
destigmatize those hackers who do not have malicious intent, it is likely
that trust among hackers, law enforcement officials, and security personnel
will grow.' 68 While elements of this trust are already visible as companies
hire hacker "tiger teams" to test their systems' security,1 69 contests may
168. Taylor has argued that strong pressures to treat all hacking as criminal have resulted in
legislation that hackers think fails to deal with Internet security weaknesses that remain latent and
untested. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 123.
169. See Could You Pass the Tiger Test?, GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 9, 2000, at 12, at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,3971784,00.html; When Is It Ethical To Hack?, BUS.
LINE, Aug. 5, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Global News Wire File.
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help develop more structured "trusted relationships" as contests evolve into
a formal, legitimized space where hackers work.
Third, as much "look-and-see" hacking, and some of the more
outrageous hacking motivated by bragging rights, is channeled into
contests, law enforcement resources are likely to be conserved. To the
extent that these resources can be concentrated on the most flagrant
instances of computer crime in effective ways, companies may become
more willing to press cybercrime cases, 170  in turn strengthening
enforcement of computer crime laws through experience.
Fourth, the contests would provide a forum for hackers to pursue their
curiosity, to think creatively, and to make technological discoveries. This
development of human capital and technological knowledge will create
social benefits to the extent that hackers are no longer marginalized. Their
new skills may be put to good uses as they find jobs in the technology
industry or as they contribute to "creative compilations"-technologies or
software produced through online experimentation and rigorous testing.'17
Finally, as suggested above, the contests would also create conditions
conducive to a broad-based discussion about Internet architecture and how
its construction should proceed. To the extent that hackers are stigmatized,
their knowledge of, and opinions about, the Internet remain on the margins
of public debate. Without access to their knowledge, the public may not
have the resources to critique developments in Internet architecture., 72 The
contests provide a forum in which hackers may receive a voice as
technological experts with valuable insights about the Internet that are
relevant to the broader public.
170. While companies are reluctant to pursue cases and advertise their security
vulnerabilities, companies' reticence also reflects a lack of faith in law enforcement. Anthony
Stavrinos, Police Launch Intelligence Network To Tackle Cybercrime, AAP NEWSFEED, July 18,
2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, AAP Newsfeed File (noting the lack of confidence in law
enforcement); see also Cybercrime Hearing, supra note 27, at 70 (statement of Mark Rasch, Vice
President, Cyberlaw, Global Integrity Corp.) ("[O]ne of the problems we have is a fundamental
distrust between the commercial sector and law enforcement."); Rosenblatt, supra note 25, at 37
(arguing that police departments are poorly equipped to handle computer crime cases and fail to
inspire confidence).
171. Linux is a prominent example of the kinds of benefits that can result when decentralized
technological expertise is harnessed to produce public goods. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh &
Robert Zarate, Super-Secure Linux, Inch by Inch, WIRED NEWS, June 11, 2002, at
http://www.wired.com/news/linux/0,1411,53004,00.html (noting the success of Security-
Enhanced Linux, an Open Source product designed in large part by volunteer programmers, at
countering attacks); see also Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the
Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 374 (2002) (generalizing from "the phenomenon of free software to
suggest characteristics that make large-scale collaborations in many information production fields
sustainable" and describing the benefits of "peer production").
172. See TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 123 (arguing that, because hackers have been
marginalized, the public is left with inadequately secure networks).
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Contests differ from the reporting rule-which presumes any instance
of reported unauthorized access to be nonmalicious '73-in that they set up a
distinct "safe harbor" where hacking is allowed. This enables the contest
proposal to avoid many of the difficulties of broader decriminalization
proposals. Because intrusions into private networks outside of this specially
created space are prohibited, the contest is more likely than the reporting
rule to attach social meaning to hacking conduct and to shape preferences.
Whereas the reporting rule poses serious concerns along four key
dimensions, the contest proposal, by maintaining a prohibition on
unregulated hacking, avoids these difficulties.
First, the reporting rule essentially permits hacking by subjecting it to a
liability rule. Hackers have the choice of pricing their activity by
determining when it is worthwhile to report and when it is not. The contest
model does not allow such individual pricing. In the contest, only a narrow
category of hacking is permitted in a specially demarcated space. Unlike the
reporting rule, the contest model does not give hackers carte blanche to
hack as long as they come clean after the fact.
Second, as a liability rule, the reporting rule permits legal breaches of
privacy. The contest does not allow hackers to invade private networks.
Since each participating firm is able to prepare before the contest begins, it
will be able to protect both its customers' and its own privacy.
Third, the fact that all targets are not alike has important policy
implications. Some targets could not accept a reporting rule, and they
would have to be declared off-limits. This fact complicates the reporting
rule and could be accommodated only with great difficulty. With contests,
targets are self-selecting. They can choose how and when to open
themselves to attack.
Fourth, under a reporting rule, small targets may not be able to defend
against hacking as well as large companies that can purchase the most
current security devices. Moreover, the reporting rule implicitly encourages
ad hoc bargaining between companies and hackers who have breached
security, an arrangement that favors larger companies. With the contest
model, bargaining is standardized and up-front, eliminating the possibility
for "green mail." The contest can also be designed to include small firms.
174
Measured against the reporting rule, the contest model avoids many of
its pitfalls. The reporting rule takes decriminalization too far. It fails to send
a clear signal that hacking is criminally prohibited, essentially allowing
hackers to self-regulate. The challenge is to determine whether the
reporting rule's benefits-the advantages deriving from
173. See supra Section 1.B (describing the reporting rule and providing a general critique of
it).
174. See supra Subsection III.B. I.
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decriminalization--could be captured through a more narrowly
circumscribed decriminalization project, the regulated hack-in contest.
Consistent with the insights of preference-shaping theory, contests can
capture these benefits while maintaining a clear prohibition on criminal
hacking.
In the contest model elaborated above, preference shaping that is begun
through criminalization is reaffirmed through positive reinforcement for
socially permissible hacking. A corollary to the limited, "safe harbor"
decriminalization of the contest is the creation of positive incentives to
obey the law, participate in the contests, and forsake criminal hacking. The
contest gives those who hack for intellectual motivation or to improve their
skill an incentive to hack not only in ways that they believe are socially
beneficial, but also in ways that are publicly recognized as legitimate.
175
Likewise, the contests provide peer recognition to those motivated by status
and reputation.1 76 By channeling hacking into legal outlets, these positive
incentives to engage in legal behavior can deter much criminal hacking.
Maintaining clear prohibitions on hacking outside of the contests, this
limited decriminalization is wholly consistent with preference-shaping
theory, which recognizes the preference-shaping power of both rewards and
the criminal law. 177 Through the positive incentives noted above, regulated
contests would not only channel activities in law-abiding directions, but
they would also shape preferences by encouraging the development of
positive social meanings for law-abiding conduct.1 8 Positive incentives are
necessary because, given the consequences of deviance labeling and the
antiauthoritarian aspects of hacker culture, criminal sanctions alone could
not do this.' 79 Criminal penalties cannot harness the positive aspects of the
hacker ethic and may even undermine them. The contest proposal provides
a preference-shaping alternative in which deterrence is achieved both by
providing clear criminal prohibitions and by nurturing hacker ethics.
175. Many hackers view themselves as making the Internet safer. See, e.g., Catherine Therese
Clarke, From CrimlNet to Cyber-Perp: Toward an Inclusive Approach to Policing the Evolving
Criminal Mens Rea on the Internet, 75 OR. L. REv. 191, 207 (1996) (arguing that hackers seek to
improve the [nternet and noting that "traditional hackers are not considered to be law breakers;
their mens rea is presumed innocent"); John Markoff, The New Watchdogs of Digital Commerce,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1995, at DI (finding that hackers want to explore the Internet fully and
eliminate "the flaws to create a perfect system"). Providing a space constructed around an
articulation of hacking's benefits can serve an important legitimating function and may even
create positive community norms. See TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 43-44 (arguing that "articulations
of what it is to hack and why people do it may have a disproportionate role to play in community
formation within the computer underground and in influencing the perceptions of those external to
the activity").
176. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
177. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 21, at 18.
178. Id.
179. See supra Section I-B.
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The claim is not that the contests will deter computer crime altogether.
An effective punishment regime could not do that. Rather, this Note
modestly suggests that the contests may help determine what the range of
normal behavior is, deterring much aberrant conduct. Remembering that it
is an interaction of costs and rewards that shapes human behavior, we
should note that the contest model is a supplement to criminal penalties.,
80
Contests would shape preferences through the confluence of positive
incentives to good conduct and penalties for criminal hacking. Computer
crime is particularly ripe for this method of preference shaping given that
hacker culture is already endowed with positive ethics that law should seek
to reinforce.
B. Potential Objections to the Contest Model and Responses
Several objections that the tournaments will actually increase computer
crime deserve consideration. Many of these objections overlook the current
context in which hacking occurs, characterizing the dangers of continuing
to rely on technological security and private enforcement measures as risks
specific to the contests. Others misunderstand the relationship between
unauthorized access, other computer crimes, and the contest framework.
While superficially attractive, none of these objections is strong enough to
reject the competitions.
First, some may argue that competitions would allow hackers to meet
each other and band together, turning their abilities to illicit uses. Upon
closer analysis, however, it is evident that tournaments would not provide
new opportunities for hackers to create criminal networks. A number of
fora already exist where hackers associate. Many hackers go to Las Vegas
each year for the DEFCON conference where they trade methods and hone
techniques. 181 During the rest of the year, hackers exchange tips in
chatrooms. 1 Given contest pseudonymity, participants would have no new
means of communication. The competitions would do little to create new
opportunities for conspiracy. Even if tournaments did create the conditions
for criminal networks, the tournaments should also make law enforcement's
job easier. By allowing for the monitoring of contests and the surveillance
of various hacker styles, competitions should lead to more effective target-
hardening measures and should also familiarize law enforcement with
hacker methods.'
83
180. For discussion on the interaction of rewards and punishments, see supra Subsection
III.B.3.
181. Thurman, supra note 101.
182. See supra note 91.
183. See Brandt, supra note 114 (describing the benefits accruing to law enforcement from
monitoring hackers' attempts to crack security). Monitoring may discourage some hackers from
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Second, the tournaments may provide a venue where hackers can hone
skills that will eventually be used to engage in criminal hacking. This
concern-that hacking contests are like a "sandbox"-also proves illusory
upon further analysis. First, rather than encouraging computer skills,
competitions simply try to harness them. As noted above, numerous and
easily accessible websites teach hacking skills. 8 4 It is not clear that
tournaments would create new interest in hacking or develop new skills
rather than channel potentially deviant behavior into positive outlets.
Contests may, however, give hackers confidence in their abilities. This may
not be a wholly negative development from a law enforcement perspective.
As noted below, to the extent that such confidence leads to the boasting that
often accompanies illegal hacking, law enforcement will be more effective.
Second, it is worth repeating that the contests do not target profit or
vandalism-motivated hacking.185 Rather, they aim to provide a substitute for
unauthorized access and to shape preferences among hackers engaged in
these kinds of activities. If the contests are successful at creating
preferences for such hacking among the targeted group, many participants
will choose not to engage in criminal activities. Third, if the developmental
theory of hacking is accurate, 186 the maturation from tool kit/newbie into
cyberpunks or old-guard hackers depends on the internalization of values.
To the extent that young hackers learn their hacking skills in chatrooms and
from websites, they are likely to develop into criminal hackers. If contests
can encourage a value-oriented education in hacking, on the other hand,
young hackers may be more likely to forswear putting their skills to illicit
uses.
18 7
participating. On the other hand, to the extent that monitoring contributes to the visibility of
hackers' skill, their reputation, and their ability to brag, it may entice some hackers to participate.
184. See supra note 91.
185. Note that some hackers may be excluded from the contest if there is reason to believe
that they are also engaging in criminal activities. See supra Subsection II1.B.4.
186. Marc Rogers has attempted to disaggregate "hacking" by categorizing hackers into
seven groups: tool kit/newbies (those relying on prewritten software), cyberpunks (vandals with
some programming capabilities), internals (disgruntled employees with system access), coders
(those familiar with programming techniques and able to write original code), old-guard hackers
(with no criminal intent), professional criminals, and cyberterrorists (the most dangerous). Rogers,
supra note 76, at 9. Drawing on this taxonomy, John Van Beveren traced hacker development and
charted their motivations from tool kit/newbies into either cyberpunks or old-guard type hackers.
The model tracks how tool kit/newbies develop skill and experience, gathering information from
books, magazines, and hacker websites. Unauthorized intrusion committed by tool kit/newbies
appears to be a gateway activity that could lead to either malicious or nonmalicious hacking. Van
Beveren, supra note 151, at 5.
187. The most powerful aspect of preference shaping, and the contests, may be their "second-
generation effects" -the fact that a current change in policy will be internalized in future years,
shaping actors' beliefs. See Katyal, supra note 75, at 2444 (noting that current changes in
incentive structures will shape how future actors perceive their desires). While preferences in the
current generation may be skewed toward counterculture posturing, a generation of hackers raised
in an atmosphere where hacking is valued for its social benefits may be more apt to prefer the
socially approved game situs for hacking than illegal hacking.
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Several "harder" contest features mitigate the possibility that contest
participants will move on to more destructive kinds of hacking. The penalty
enhancements described in the previous Part are designed to curb hacking
outside of the competitions by making it both unattractive and prohibitively
costly. 188 As noted above, contests will also allow law enforcement to focus
resources on the most deviant kinds of hacking. Another key effect of the
contests is that sites themselves will become harder targets after sponsoring
contests, reducing the success of illegal hacking efforts. Two computer
scientists at Harvard recently argued that organizations that share security
information are less attractive to malicious hackers.1 89 By sponsoring
contests, firms may thus identify themselves as a site that malicious hackers
should avoid. Finally, as hacking becomes destigmatized through the
contests, more hackers may be willing to help law enforcement track and
detect criminally minded hackers. 90 Each of these factors mitigates the
problem suggested by the training ground thesis.
Third, criminal law scholars have noted that, because of the substitution
effect, punishments for one crime may increase other kinds of crime that
are just as serious or perhaps even more dangerous. The relationship
between crack cocaine and heroine provides a clear example. 9 While no
reliable data on drug use exist, it is likely that the penalty structure for these
drugs-the crack to heroin punishment ratio is somewhere between 80:1 to
400: 1-would encourage drug dealers and users to substitute heroin for
crack to avoid the more severe penalties. 92 Both income and substitution
effects are at work here. The income effect predicts that an increase in the
price of a good (conceived in terms of either monetary cost or severity of
punishment) reduces the real income of a consumer of that good. The
substitution effect tempers the income effect of a price increase, however,
when the consumer switches to a cheaper good. In some circumstances,
such as when heroin is substituted for crack cocaine, the substitute may be
more harmful than the targeted activity. Thus, the income and substitution
effects, when applied to criminal law, suggest that under some conditions a
high price-whether monetary or legal-for one crime may increase the
commission of other, perhaps more socially damaging, crimes.193
188. See supra Part III.
189. Hafner & Biggs, supra note 118.
190. See, e.g., TsuTOMU SHIrmOMURA, TAKE DOwN (1996) (describing a hacker who helped
law enforcement track and capture Kevin Mitnick, a notorious computer criminal); Leslie Walker,
Taking a Whack at Hackers, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2000, at El (describing "[a] new breed of
security firms" and their practice of hiring "hacker trackers").
191. See Katyal, supra note 75, at 2402-08 (analyzing crack cocaine and heroin in terms of
the substitution effect).
192. Id. at 2404-05.
193. Id. at 2388.
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Applying substitution analysis to the hack-in contest proposal, should
we expect hack-in contests to produce an increase in crime? Substitution
generally suggests that an increase in the cost of one crime will increase the
incidence of a substitute crime that is less expensive. Analogizing from this
insight, one might argue that, while the substitution effect will encourage
hackers to substitute away from criminal hacking toward hacking in the
contests, the income effect may encourage an increase in both activities
because a hacker's overall "resources" will go further than before. To
address the substitution objection, it will be useful first to clarify the
relationship between unauthorized access and other types of crime. Second,
having considered both the nature of the increased "resources" a contest
participant would have and the relevant characteristics of the contest
framework outlined above, we will question whether the income effect has
any predictive value in this context.
With respect to the first issue, it is unlikely that hackers engaged in
unauthorized access will substitute other types of crime. It bears repeating
that the contests do not target profit-motivated computer crime. The
elasticity of substitution, the ease with which the demand for one crime
may be substituted for the demand for another, is small with respect to
unauthorized access because it is a crime with specific payoffs, such as
intellectual stimulation and pride, rather than generalizable payoffs, such as
money, which can motivate a variety of criminal activity. Moreover,
because hackers, particularly those engaged in unauthorized access, have
sunk costs in skill development, they are unlikely to engage in other types
of crime.1 94 Each of these points suggests that those hackers targeted by the
contests-hackers engaged in unauthorized access-are unlikely to
substitute toward other kinds of crime.
The second part of the objection states that because the cost of the legal
substitute-hack-in contests-is cheap, hackers have more "resources" to
devote to criminal hacking.1 95 With respect to unauthorized access, it is not
clear what kinds of "resources" would accrue to a hacker who participates
in contests as a result of the income effect. The income effect would neither
increase a hacker's available time nor his monetary resources. Skill is the
most likely resource a hacker would develop. If skill development lies at
the heart of the objection, however, the argument simply reiterates the
"sandbox" complaint in different language and is subject to the same
response.
Assuming that there would be an independent income effect in this
context, the argument is susceptible on its own terms. In order to accurately
194. See, e.g., id. at 2442 (noting that "[slometimes criminal activity has sunk costs" and that
"criminals may not be able to transfer their skills to other areas").
195. The assumption is largely unwarranted. The substitution and income cffects come most
clearly into play with respect to crimes of consumption or profit-motivated crimes. Id. at 2432-33.
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assess the income effect's impact, we must consider the mechanism that is
built into the contest framework to address this problem. As the cost of
"good" hacking in contests decreases, the cost of illegal hacking increases
for contest participants due to the penalty enhancements that would
apply.' 96 Discounting the probability of capture, it is not clear what impact
the income effect would have in these circumstances, where a fall in the
price of a legal "good" is accompanied by an increase in the price of its
illegal substitute. Moreover, the critique fails to consider the extent to
which the contest is an appropriate substitute for illegal unauthorized
access, 197 and whether, by legitimizing a previously marginalized activity, it
may actually improve on the illegal substitute, supplying hackers with a
superior "good" at a lower cost. Thus, while the worry about the
development of skill "resources" is best stated in the form of the "sandbox"
argument, the mechanism by which the substitution and income effects
could lead to increased crime has little independent explanatory power with
respect to the hack-in contest model.
Fourth, one might argue that bragging rights would be greater for
hackers acting outside of the contest framework. While these bragging
payoffs may be potentially higher than the reputational gains available
through the contests, the risks would also be greater. Since by its nature
bragging, unlike the crimes themselves, is easily detectible and traceable,
most culprits are discovered because they have bragged.' 98 The reallocation
of law enforcement resources resulting from the contests would mean that
such bragging would receive even greater law enforcement attention. Law
enforcement strategy would likely include targeting braggers for violations
of substantive law, reinforcing contests as the most important source of
prestige in the hacker community. The expected severity of the penalty for
braggers would also likely increase, since penalty enhancements would
apply to hacking on contest websites and to hacking by former contest
participants. Moreover, government could take steps to shame hackers who
brag about illegal hacking exploits and are caught, emphasizing the contests
as the primary source of hacker prestige.199 While it is not possible to
eliminate the risk that some hackers may seek bragging rights outside of the
contest framework, that possibility is less dangerous than it would appear at
first glance.
196. See supra Subsection III.B.2.
197. This question turns on two issues: (1) the ability to provide the utility obtainable through
unauthorized access, namely reputation and intellectual stimulation; and (2) whether there is a
strong preference in the hacker community for unauthorized access over contests. If bragging
rights are available through the contests and the contests are challenging and frequent, the first
requirement should be met. Anecdotal evidence indicates that hackers may actually prefer contests
or other legal hacking venues to engaging in illegal activities. See supra Subsection 11.B.4.
198. See Cha & Schwartz, supra note 149 (reporting on bragging by hackers).
199. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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Fifth, hacking may be addictive. If so, one might argue that
encouraging the activity through privately sponsored contests might lead to
increased, compulsive hacking in undesirable instances. Anecdotal
evidence indicates that there is some truth to the addiction thesis. In an
early trial of the notorious hacker Kevin Mitnick, the judge sentenced him
to rehabilitation for his addiction.2 0 0 Also, in the case of Regina v. Bedworth
in the United Kingdom, the jury acquitted Paul Bedworth of hacking
offenses, accepting his defense that an addiction to hacking precluded him
from having the requisite intent to be convicted. 0 Concerned about the
addictive potential of a variety of Internet activities, Dr. Kimberly Young, a
clinical psychologist, has set up the Center for Online Addiction. 20 2 These
developments notwithstanding, the addiction thesis is not altogether
noncontroversial. Others have stressed that "[tihe addictive aspects of
hacking... only partially describe an activity that has an array of
intermingled motivations" and have distinguished between intellectual
curiosity and compulsion. 20 3 Even assuming that some hackers are addicted,
however, it would seem that offering a harmless substitute is a better
solution than leaving them to continue engaging in illegal unauthorized
intrusion.2 0 4 The question is whether a hacker's addiction will be fed in a
structured, socially beneficial manner, or whether it will be satisfied in
some potentially more harmful way. While counseling may be appropriate
in the most severe cases, hack-in contests can mitigate much of the social
loss associated with addictive hacking. For hack-in contests to provide a
safe substitute for addicted hackers, the contests must be frequent so that
these hackers do not feel compelled to engage in illegal hacking.
Implicit in the suggestion that hacking may be addictive is the idea that
"good" and "bad" hacking are complements, an increase of one promoting
an increase of the other. The perceived permeability between the two kinds
of hacking, seemingly illustrated at the Black Hat and DEFCON events
where security experts and hackers mingle, is misleading. Hackers have
long been marginalized and faced with few avenues through which to
200. Paul Feldman, Prop. 187 Ruling Frustrating for Voters, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1995, at
Al.
201. Computer Hackers "Broke into NASA, " HERALD (Glasgow), May 21, 1993, at 12.
202. See Ctr. for Online Addiction, at http://www.netaddiction.com (last visited Mar. 4,
2003).
203. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 48.
204. The distinction between reactions to and preconditions for an addiction is an important
one. Efforts to deter hacking through the criminal law, as noted above, have largely failed. To the
extent that hacking is compulsive or addictive, these addictive habits preexist hacking contests.
Thus, hacking contests constitute a reaction to dependence and, as such, they can provide an
outlet for compulsive hacking that is not socially harmful. It is also possible that contests will
contribute to the creation of new or strengthened addictions in some hackers, resulting in an
increase in socially undesirable hacking. As the distinction between socially useful hacking and
illegal unauthorized access hardens, however, and contests begin to be sponsored more frequently,
this risk should subside.
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engage in legitimate hacking. 20 5 Moreover, this labeling or lumping
process, as argued above, can have the unfortunate result of solidifying
deviant attitudes. 20 6 Now that hackers are gaining acceptance in the security
community, 20 7 the boundary between "good" and "bad" hacking appears
blurred. The currently unstable boundary is not so much a marker of
permeability, however, as an indication that former categories are losing
their resonance. As space opens for some kinds of hacking to be considered
legitimate, hacking is no longer stigmatized per se, and hackers formerly
engaged in illegal hacking shift to activities that are considered socially
beneficial. While some "gray-hat" hackers do profess to straddle this
boundary, 208 recent developments indicate a shift of attitudes capable of
distinguishing between good and bad aspects of hacking that had formerly
been homogeneously labeled as illegitimate.209 Thus, the current lack of
clarity appears to be part of the process of reconfiguring boundaries.
Finally, it is possible that a hacker who participated in a contest and
uncovered a vulnerability would choose not to reveal it, resulting in greater
insecurity rather than target hardening. After the contest, the hacker could
compromise the site for any number of purposes-to engage in fraud, theft,
or vandalism, or to use the site as a platform from which to engage in such
activities. While this would be a serious concern for an independent site
205. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 123 (arguing that the "computer security industry shows a
marked reluctance to differentiate between 'responsible hackers' and vandals"); see also Katyal,
supra note 75, at 2398 (recognizing that "stigmatization costs," the ostracization of those who
have engaged or who are suspected to have engaged in illegal activity, are an important factor
contributing to the perpetuation of criminal activities by certain actors).
206. See Katyal, supra note 75, at 2444-45, 2457-61 (arguing that stigmatization reduces the
cost of future criminal activity, since reputational costs have already accrued, and may lead to the
creation of subgroup norms favoring criminality); supra note 80 and accompanying text.
207. Amanda C. Kooser, Hack Away: If Being Hacked Is Inevitable, Wouldn't It Be Better if
the Hackers Were on Your Side?, ENTREPRENEUR, Mar. 1, 2002, at 20 (describing Rent-a-Hacker
Inc., a company that draws on hacker knowledge to strengthen customers' computer systems);
Susan Moran, Now Hiring: Hackers, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 12, 1998, § 6, at I (noting the increasing
frequency with which hackers are hired to help toughen Internet security); Dequendre Neeley,
Hire Thine Enemy? (How To Prevent Computer Attacks), SECURITY MGMT., Sept. 1, 1999, 1999
WL 14496643 (noting the growing trend to hire "underground hackers and system crackers either
as consultants or regular staff to conduct penetration tests on their networks"); Bob Violino,
Hackers for Hire, INFORMATIONWEEK, June 21, 1993, LEXIS, Nexis Library, InformationWeek
File (quoting Dorothy Denning as saying that "[i]f you really want to find out if your system is
protected against hackers, you must have hackers beat away at it").
208. Gottlieb, supra note 88, at 36 (describing the hacker group LOpht as "gray-hat," a
morally ambiguous position, for its willingness to help government and enhance Internet security
as well as to advise malicious hackers). In addition to gray-hats, hackers are typically
characterized as black-hat-those who hack maliciously-and white-hat-those who hack
legitimately, including security staff and researchers. Jude Thaddeus, The Confessions of a White
Hat Hacker, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 4, 2000, at http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/
securitylstory/0,10801,54616,00.html.
209. Helen D'Antoni, Hacker Hires Don't Interest Most Businesses, INFORMATIONWEEK,
Oct. 22, 2001, at http://www.informationweek.com/story/IWK20011019S002 (noting that, while
"the idea of hiring a hacker remains inconceivable for many business-technology professionals,"
half of the polled employers expressed a willingness to hire a hacker as a consultant).
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sponsoring a contest without government support, it is much less
problematic in the framework laid out above. Both the penalty
enhancements, which would apply to contest participants, and the honeypot
monitoring suggestion, which could record each participant's activities for
later review, address this problem. Rather than actually monitoring
participants' activities, contest sponsors could equip their sites with an
"early warning" alarm system such that no contest participant could breach
security without the sponsors being notified. To the extent that formal
monitoring, or even the less intricate alarm system, is impractical due either
to cost or hacker reluctance to participate in such contests, law enforcement
could agree to prioritize contest sponsors who have been hacked. A menu
of options is thus available to minimize the possibility that sponsors would
be victimized by contest participants.
The challenges to hack-in contests assessed above do not undermine the
proposal's strength. If implemented so as to account for hackers'
motivations, reputations, and competitive spirits as well as their desire for
social legitimacy, contests could play a powerful preference-shaping role in
the hacker community. Contests must be integrated with criminal sanctions,
however. Preference shaping through criminal law alone will be relatively
ineffective. Thus, shaping preferences by creating incentives to induce
positive behavior may nurture hacker ethics that value law-abiding
behavior. Over the long term, contests may help develop hacking norms
that encourage obeying the law. These contests may particularly impress
young people-those most prone to vandalism-who have not yet become
socialized within a particular hacking subculture. If a young hacker thinks
others are obeying the law and getting their biggest hacking thrills from
competing in organized games, he may choose the same route. 210 The
contests' objective is to cultivate strong preferences among hackers for law-
abiding behavior. While government must reinforce this process, savvy
marketing that sells the idea to hackers is an essential part of the approach.
CONCLUSION
Many of the policies used to deter computer crime have proved
ineffective. Despite criminal penalties and regulation through code itself,
hackers continue to intrude into private networks with impunity. At the
same time, the social response to computer crime remains embryonic.
Popular attitudes are still largely plastic. In this context, it is important to
210. Akers ct al., supra note 100, at 638 (emphasizing the influence of peer groups on
behavior); Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner's Law and
Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REv. 367, 368-69 (2002) (arguing that, as moral and emotional
reciprocators, people conform their actions and attitudes to reflect what they believe to be the
behavior of others around them).
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begin shaping attitudes with nonlegal tools. Contests, like those proposed in
this Note, may play a role in turning normal hacking behavior away from
unwarranted intrusions.
The contest seeks to interweave the moral message of the criminal law
with the hacker's culture of openness on the web. It balances the benefits of
decriminalization with the need to maintain a clear prohibition on criminal
hacking, and it is tailored to the culture of the community it is meant to
affect. The contest provides the benefit of having "eyes on the street"
without giving hackers carte blanche to invade private networks or
individually price their conduct. With many hacking tools already available
for download from the web, hacking has been democratized and may well
be on the road to normalization. It is important to experiment with new
policies that might begin to shape preferences effectively. By reinforcing
criminal sanctions and positive social meanings through positive incentives,
a system of structured contests may be an important means of nurturing
socially beneficial hacking norms that are largely self-enforcing.
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